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Abstract 
Vaccination has been one of the major successes in global health, providing a cost-
effective method of reducing morbidity and mortality. However, middle- and low-income 
countries are often unable to access newer vaccines in a timely manner. This analysis outlines 
market-influenced solutions that address the inequity.   
First, the current state of the vaccine industry and the roles of manufacturers are 
examined, and then the impact of innovation on the industry is assessed.  High-, middle- and 
low-income country markets are compared.  Finally, an assessment is made of the models that 
increase vaccine access.  The industry, innovation impact, market and access model analyses 
lead to a proposal of a complementary strategic plan for improved vaccine access for developing 
countries.  This analysis defines the key success factors for future vaccine development and 
manufacturing that will equilibrate vaccine use across the globe.  
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1: OVERVIEW 
1.1 An Introduction to Vaccines 
Vaccines are biological preparations used to prevent or limit disease. They trigger an 
immune response within the body.  As a part of this response, an immune ‘memory’ is formed 
to respond to any future encounters with the disease agent.  Vaccination began with Edward 
Jenner’s use of cowpox, which protected against the related smallpox virus. In 1796, Jenner 
inoculated a young boy with cowpox from a lesion on a milkmaid’s hand.  He later administered 
smallpox to the child, who did not become infected with the second pathogen (Sprang, 2002).  
The results of similar treatments with 23 other individuals were published, giving widespread 
acceptance to this revolutionary medical technique.  The root of the word vaccine comes from 
this first treatment, originating from the Latin word for cow, vaca. 
The human immune system is a complex regulatory and surveillance network of 
interacting cells, tissues, and proteins, designed to respond and provide protection against 
foreign materials that enter the body. The immune system is stimulated by an encounter with 
an antigen.  Antigens are components of disease causing agents, which can be introduced 
through immunization.  When pathogens gain entry into the body for the first time, “antigen 
presenting cells” break them down and display components of the agent on their cell surface.  In 
turn, antigens activate other immune cells, namely T and B-cells; they transform and seek to 
inactivate the intruder.   In the first response to a pathogen, immune memory is created.  This 
results in an enhanced response to subsequent exposure to the pathogen. In the event that a 
particular disease agent gains access to the body, the immune system responds specifically 
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within a matter of hours, rather than days or weeks. Immune memory is the basis for 
vaccination.   
Though Jenner demonstrated the effectiveness of cowpox vaccination in protection 
against smallpox, development of additional vaccines did not materialize until almost 100 years 
after his discovery.  In the late 1800s, Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch demonstrated that 
microorganisms cause infections in humans.  They further demonstrated that unique 
microorganisms cause specific diseases. This understanding provided the rationale for using 
attenuated microorganisms to create vaccines.  Attenuated vaccines are produced by culturing 
viruses or bacteria under conditions so that they lose their virulence, but still have the ability to 
invoke an immune response. Other vaccines utilize inactivated microorganisms or non-
replicating components of the agent. Types of common vaccines include: 
o Attenuated (weakened) live viruses 
o Inactivated (killed) viruses and bacteria 
o Toxoid vaccine (toxins produced by bacteria) 
o Genetically engineered viral or bacterial components   
An immune response to an infection can take several days or weeks.  This delay can be 
long enough to allow the disease to manifest itself. However, if the agent or a component of it 
has previously challenged the immune system, the response is faster and stronger.  The body 
can react before the disease is caused.  Immune memory can last for years, but some vaccines 
need repeated doses to maintain the immunity after the initial vaccination.  Today, there are 
over 30 vaccine-preventable diseases.  The most common are listed in Table 1.   
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Table 1: Vaccine-Preventable Diseases (2009) 
Cervical Cancer Pneumococcal infections 
Chicken Pox Poliomyelitis 
Cholera Rabies 
Diphtheria Rotavirus 
Haemophilus influenzae type B Rubella 
Hepatitis A and B Shingles 
Japanese Encephalitis Smallpox 
Influenza Tetanus 
Measles Tuberculosis 
Meningococcal group A & B Typhoid fever 
Mumps Varicella 
Pertussis Yellow Fever 
Source:  Adapted from WHO, 2009a. 
1.2 Social and Economical Benefits of Vaccines 
As shown in Table 2, vaccination is one of the greatest public health achievements in the 
20th century. Through immunization, smallpox has been completely eradicated. In addition, 
rubella, tetanus, measles, diphtheria, Haemophilus influenzae type B (Hib), and number of other 
infectious diseases have been controlled worldwide.  
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Table 2: Annual Infectious Disease Morbidity in 20th Century and 2008 
Disease 20th Century Annual 
Morbidity  
2008 Total % Decrease 
Diphtheria 175,885 0 100 
Measles 503,282 132 99.9 
Mumps  152,209 386 99.9 
Polio (paralytic) 16,316 0 100 
Rubella 47,745 17 99.9 
Smallpox 48,164 0 100 
Tetanus 1314 15 98.6 
Source:  Adapted from Red Book, 2009. 
The social and economic benefits of vaccination are numerous. In addition to protection 
from death or severe acute illness, vaccination prevents the lifelong after effects of some 
diseases. Long-term morbidity is exemplified by polio, whose survivors often suffer from 
permanent paralysis.  The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) has already saved the lives of 
hundreds of thousands of children and has prevented additional children from developing 
serious disability from paralytic polio (GPEI, 2010).  In countries where manual labour is the 
predominant form of livelihood, such a disability would completely curtail an individual’s ability 
to earn a living, creating a significant burden to society as a whole.  Supplementary human 
resources would be needed to support such individuals.  Additional costs would be incurred, 
such as the cost of reduced quality of life and societal ostracism, both of which cannot be easily 
calculated in terms of monetary value. Successful vaccination programs can prevent other long-
term morbidities. Measles infection can damage the brain, hindering a child’s cognitive ability. 
Children free from such a disease could attend school regularly and would possess a greater 
potential for learning.  
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The cost-benefit analysis for vaccines compares the total costs and benefits to 
determine the net social advantage (Boardman, Greenberg, Vining & Weimer, 1996).  
Parameters include direct medical costs of disease treatment, indirect costs of lost productivity, 
and intangible costs such as pain and suffering against the medical costs of vaccine 
administration. Vaccination minimizes care costs and allows transfer of resources to the 
treatment of unpreventable diseases. The extension of life expectancy for vaccinated individual 
means that citizens are able to contribute for a longer period to the economic output of a 
nation. When child mortality drops, there is a concomitant drop in the birth rate.  It costs less to 
treat children for illness who are not already sick with vaccine- preventable infections.  Healthy 
communities and countries are in a better position to attract foreign investments and capital 
from tourism.       
Lastly, immunization of a sufficient majority of the population –good ‘vaccine coverage’-
provides ‘herd immunity’ that prevents epidemic outbreak of diseases. Between 1967 and 1977, 
$1.35 B annually was saved worldwide through a smallpox eradication program (Barrett, 2004). 
In the US, every dollar spent on vaccines avoids $6.30 of direct medical cost, which, in aggregate 
for the nation, is $10.5 B. When potential indirect costs, loss of work, disability and death are 
included, this figure increases to $18.40, or an aggregated social benefit of $42 B (Every Child By 
Two, 2010). In 2000, when pneumococcal conjugate vaccine Prevnar 7 was first introduced, its 
cost-effectiveness analysis was projected. This study found that vaccination of healthy infants 
with Prevnar7 would prevent more than 12,000 cases of meningitis, 53,000 cases of pneumonia, 
1 million episodes of otitis media, and 116 deaths.  The analysis showed that the vaccination 
program will avoid US $342 M in medical treatment and $415 M for work-loss and indirect 
consequences of illness (Lieu et al., 2000).  
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Immunization is unparalleled in providing a cost-efficient improvement to overall 
welfare. Nevertheless, a drive towards universal vaccination coverage for all vaccine-
preventable diseases will be a difficult task due to the high price of novel vaccines.  Vaccines 
under patent protection can command supplier driven prices. Until 10 years ago, the only 
vaccines on the market were low-margin commodity products and many companies exited the 
business.  Research and development (R&D) costs for current vaccine candidates are on the rise, 
as major causes of disease such as TB and HIV have eluded traditional methods of vaccine 
generation.   This paper will review potential solutions to this problem of access. 
1.3 Access in High-, Middle- and Low-Income Countries 
Access to vaccines remains highly differentiated across the globe.  The key factor of 
differentiation is the income level of the country. The World Bank classifies countries based on 
per capita Gross National Income (GNI) as follows: high-income, $12,196 or more; middle-
income, $996 - $12,195; and low-income, $995 or less (World Bank, 2010a). In most high-
income countries such as the US, public health initiatives are sufficiently supported to allow 
rapid incorporation of new vaccines into the public health plan. For example, GSK’s Cervarix for 
the prevention of Human Papillomavirus (HPV) retails for approximately $125 /dose and yet 
received national government orders from both the UK and the Netherlands in 2009. The 
European Medicines Agency (EMEA) gave regulatory approval for sale of the vaccine in late 2007 
(GSK, 2007).   
In contrast, low- and middle-income countries have often gained access to new vaccines 
10 or more years after their introduction in developed world markets. This is due to relatively 
limited medical infrastructure as well as the high initial cost of new vaccines. Most vaccines 
require both cold storage and medical staff who can administer them. New vaccines have been 
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introduced at prices that are as much as 1000 times the cost of older commodity vaccines (CDC, 
2010c; UNICEF, 2010c).   
Over the last 10 years, the Global Alliance for Vaccines Initiative (now the GAVI Alliance) 
has facilitated vaccine access for low-income countries. The mandate of GAVI was to improve 
vaccine access to new and underused vaccines in the developing world, and it has had 
significant success in this regard. The success of GAVI was achieved in part by consolidating 
vaccine purchases and leveraging the resultant buying power to negotiate lower prices on new 
vaccines. Some key manufacturers have been willing to price differentiate in exchange for 
access to a much larger market and stable demand. 
GAVI only provides support for countries that had an annual GNI per capita of less than 
US $1000 in 2003. Some emerging economies may be just over this income threshold, but their 
limited healthcare budgets make purchasing newer vaccines impossible. Some more populous 
countries have been able to remedy this by negotiating intermediate prices due to a large 
market size. Others have developed competitive national vaccine industries able to reverse 
engineer vaccines at low margins. Nevertheless, many mid-income countries have had to forgo 
the purchase of newer vaccines in their public health budget. For these countries, citizens with 
sufficient income purchase innovative vaccines privately. In addition, GAVI has not yet provided 
support to any country for some of the newest vaccines, such as those protective against 
rotavirus.  As a result, few low- or middle-income countries have had access to these vaccines. 
1.4 Organization of This Analysis 
This analysis will address methods to improve access to vaccines for low- and middle-
income countries.  An overview of the global vaccine industry will follow this chapter.  There will 
be a high-level analysis of the five dominant Multinational Vaccine Companies (MVCs).  The 
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chapter will also review a sampling of mid-size vaccine manufacturers who occupy uniquely 
valuable niches in the industry. We will then review current innovations in vaccines, and the 
strategic impact of innovation on the industry. As the focus of this paper is on models of 
improved vaccine access in low- and middle-income countries, an in-depth industry analysis will 
not be a component of the document.  We will then review the different vaccine markets as 
defined by their income level.  Lastly, we will move to an analysis of models for improved 
vaccine access in low- and middle-income countries, and propose a new model for the future. 
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2: THE VACCINE INDUSTRY 
In this chapter, we will provide an overview of the vaccine industry. A brief history of the 
vaccine value chain and factors influencing the vaccine supply are discussed. Finally, we will 
introduce the five MVCs and a sampling of mid-size companies, looking at their products, 
innovations and collaborations.   Aspects that pertain to developing world vaccine access will be 
highlighted. 
2.1 Current Industry Overview 
For much of the 1980s and 1990s, vaccines were low-margin commodity products. Low-
cost vaccines designed to prevent childhood infectious diseases were predominant. The targets 
for these vaccines were for diseases such as diphtheria, polio, tetanus, mumps, rubella, and 
measles.  These infections most acutely affected developing countries with a limited ability to 
purchase medication.  Price pressure from governments and public-health organizations with 
strong buying power lowered revenue potential. A number of adverse events associated with 
vaccines generated negative publicity.  Consequent litigation costs made the industry 
unattractive, and many firms exited as a result. 
Over the last 10 years, a number of factors have begun to increase revenue potential 
and attract new entrants. Some of these factors include rapid uptake of new vaccines to disease 
agents affecting high-income countries, introduction of new technologies allowing competitive 
differentiation, and support or subsidy from wealthy governments for vaccine manufacturers. 
Today, vaccines are the fastest growing drug class, with predicted global revenue of US $52 B by 
2016 and a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 11.5% (Taylor, 2010). Even with these 
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attractive attributes, the industry is highly concentrated. Five major pharmaceutical companies - 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), Merck, Novartis, Sanofi Pasteur, and Pfizer (formerly Wyeth) - hold 85% 
of the global vaccine market. Dominance by these five MVCs means that industry competition 
and turnover are low. With a limited number of firms producing the majority of vaccines, there 
is a high probability of fluctuating manufacturing capacity and vaccine shortages. This is most 
problematic when a single company produces a vaccine. In 2006, only one of the paediatric 
vaccines was made by more than two suppliers; seven of the vaccines were made by a single 
company (CBI, 2006). 
2.1.1 Industry Downturn and Re-emergence 
Just over thirty years ago, the landscape of the vaccine industry was markedly different. 
There were 25 vaccine companies serving the US market; 14 of these companies distributed 
their products internationally (Lancet Infectious Disease, 2004). Between 1988 and 2001, ten of 
the paediatric vaccine manufacturers reduced or completely halted production. Old vaccines 
lost margins as their manufacture was usually simple and barriers to market entry were low. It 
was not lucrative to develop new vaccines targeting diseases that predominantly affected low-
income countries.  These countries could not afford the margins typical for new pharmaceutical 
products. When neurological harm was linked to the DPT vaccine, the resultant lawsuits 
contributed to all but one of the major manufacturers exited the market (Sugarman, 2007).  The 
combination of the threat of new entrants, rivalry among existing manufacturers, high buyer 
bargaining power led to an industry that was unattractive.  Ann effective monopoly was created 
for several vaccine manufacturers (Porter, 2008). 
In recent years, technological advances, interest in controlling health budgets and 
legislation protecting vaccine producers from liability has lead to renewed interest in the vaccine 
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industry. Two new vaccines, Prevnar and Gardasil, exceeded US $1 B in revenue; this new profit 
potential led to a surge in vaccine companies and the development of new vaccines (CNN 
Money, 2007).  As major producers face the threat of new entrants, they have moved to 
strengthen their vaccine value chain by acquiring relatively mature vaccine related technologies 
from other companies. 
Figure 1 shows the major acquisitions that took place within the past decade. Pfizer 
chose to enter into the vaccine industry through several major acquisitions; Powder Med, Coley, 
and the US $68 B acquisition of Wyeth in the last 5 years were all part of this strategy. When 
Pfizer’s flagship drug Lipitor goes off patent in 2011, it will lose much of its annual US $12 B in 
revenue (Randall & Pettypiece, 2009). The acquisition of Wyeth’s pneumococcal vaccine 
franchise will likely offset some of this loss.  Prevnar 13, the second-generation pneumococcal 
vaccine, is Pfizer’s biggest product launch for 2010 (EP Vantage, 2010). Novartis also entered the 
vaccine industry, with the acquisition of a significant vaccine manufacturer.  Sanofi Pasteur’s 
acquisition of India’s Shantha Biotechnics meant access to manufacturing capabilities and 
market share in emerging economies for the MVC (Martino, 2009). 
  
Figure 1: Vaccine Industry Major
Source: Adapted from acquisition press releases.
2.1.2 Factors Influencing Vaccine Research and Development
Despite improved market conditions, there remain significant 
vaccine development and manufacturing. These include high development costs for new 
vaccines, the re-emergences of liability issues, and price control by governments and 
supranational organizations. 
Development of a vaccine can take 12 to 15 years and cost an estimated US $1
the vaccine is developed, manufacturing, storage, and cold chain management add considerable 
additional expense. Each type of vaccine needs unique manufacturing and fill/finish facilities; 
moreover, they must meet the standards set by one or more regul
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of stringency, the costs per unit also increase.  The cost of building and maintenance is incurred 
regardless of the number of vaccine units produced. Vaccines are administered in a limited 
number of doses, reducing the market potential. Hence, the demand for a vaccine needs to be 
sufficiently large to justify the fixed-cost associated with it. 
Healthy individuals receive vaccines. As a result, any temporally associated adverse 
events are likely to be attributed to the vaccine.  Children are the most common recipients, and 
products that may cause them harm face severe response. In 1988, the US government set up a 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) to address claims against vaccine manufacturers.  
The “Vaccine Court” examines the claims for a true causal relationship to the vaccine.  
Compensation is awarded from a trust funded by an excise tax applied against each dose of the 
vaccine administered in the US (Sugarman, 2007). While this addressed the risks of litigation for 
some years, more recently, claimants have tried to circumvent the process. On March 8, 2010, 
the US Supreme Court agreed to hear a case in which the vaccine manufacturers were sued 
directly (USA Today, 2010). These lawsuits are mentioned in the annual reports of all the MVCs 
involved as a risk to their business. 
Governments have increasingly stringent criteria that a pharmaceutical product must 
meet to be purchased for the public health system.  In 2008, the UK government appeared to 
purchase Cervarix for HPV disease prevention due to its lower cost over Gardasil.  This was 
despite the fact that Cervarix may have offered inferior protection (Boseley, 2008). 
In this financial landscape, only well established multinational pharmaceutical 
companies have sufficient resources to take a novel vaccine through to the market.  With high 
development costs, vaccine manufacturers need to charge a premium to recover the costs of 
their innovation.  Demand therefore has to be strong in high-income countries. The result is that 
vaccine development by MVCs does not occur for diseases that predominantly affect medium 
  
and low-income countries.  In recent years, private philanthropies, govern
private partnerships have attempted 
2.1.3 Vaccine Development Value Chain
Vaccines are complete pathogenic organisms or complex biological derivatives of an 
organism. They are designed to stimulate th
and vaccines follow a complex development process. Each phase in this process is increasingly 
expensive; however, development risk decreases with each stage.
Five major companies have developed capabilities in
chain (Figures 2 & 3). These firms possess resources and knowledge to take a vaccine from 
discovery stage to the clinic independently. However, public sector university and government 
laboratories often play a pivotal role 
research. 
Figure 2: Vaccine Industry Value Chain
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most often the companies must collaborate with MVCs as they enter clinical trials. Similar to the 
pharmaceutical industry, these large companies depend on smaller biotechnology companies to 
fill the development pipeline. Most commonly, new vaccine development projects enter the 
MVC pipelines through partnerships or outright acquisitions. Usually, no more than two MVCs 
compete on a particular vaccine indication. However, there is competition between 
biotechnology companies for partnership or acquisition opportunities with MVCs. 
The majority of biotechnology companies lack the resources or the skills needed to 
advance into the later phases of clinical trials. The size of clinical trials for vaccines can range 
from a few thousand to 70,000 people (IRIN, 2009; FDA, 2010). Most of these studies are in 
multiple countries. Clinical trials require the training of health care workers, recruiting test 
candidates, and managing test sites and trial data.  All of these necessities are expensive and 
become even more complicated when the studies are run in different population demographics. 
Even with their internal capabilities, MVCs sometimes outsource trial management activities to 
specialized clinical trial CROs. 
Manufacturing is another expensive and critical component of the value chain.  Vaccine 
production must occur under Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP).  Many countries have 
national GMP standards, and the WHO provides several guidance and training documents for 
products purchased by the WHO (WHO, 2010g).  The International Conference on 
Harmonization works to standardize GMP guidelines globally, but different criterion fulfilment 
may be needed for different countries.  The five MVCs can leverage their knowledge of GMP 
from their pharmaceutical product lines.  For smaller entities, GMP requirements create another 
barrier to entry into the vaccine industry. 
Vaccines require approval by national regulatory agencies (NRAs) before they are made 
available to the public; this regulatory process is very stringent.  The product candidate must 
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clearly demonstrate efficacy, safety, quality, and good manufacturing processes in order to gain 
approval. The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the European Medicines Agency 
(EMEA) is always a first choice for MVCs.  Mid-size vaccine producers often choose to gain 
approval from home country NRAs. Approval by a home country regulatory agency recognized 
by the WHO is a critical step towards entering the UN agencies Vaccine market.  As UNICEF 
purchases 40% of the global vaccine doses for all diseases, this provides significant return 
potential (UNICEF, 2010a). 
 All vaccine development programs follow the process described above. Often, multiple 
public and private entities contribute to the vaccine value chain at specific steps. In the 
following section, we will examine how a constant vaccine supply is maintained.    
2.1.4 Maintaining Vaccine Supply 
In the 2000s, there was a shortage of eight of the eleven vaccines administered to 
children. In 2004, there was a major influenza vaccine shortage due to manufacturing problems 
at Chiron (CNN Money, 2004). These supply crises reflect the industry’s high concentration of 
manufacturing capabilities. Vaccine manufacturing is a complex and sensitive process. Unlike 
manufacturing a chemically synthesized pharmaceutical agent, slight changes in raw materials 
or even the environment can pose threats to the production of biological molecules. One 
particularly illustrative example is the production of the influenza vaccine. This process includes 
injecting live viruses into fertilized chicken eggs, collecting the virus-infected liquid inside the 
egg and then inactivating the virus with formalin treatment. Viruses produced in such a manner 
are incapable of causing a natural infection but elicit an immune response. This process is 
inefficient, needing 6 months of production time and two eggs to produce a single dose.  
Furthermore, no two eggs will have the same production capacity (Bond, 2009).  Different 
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strains of influenza may also require different conditions to be cultured efficiently in eggs; this 
was the primary reason for the significant delays in production of H1N1 pandemic vaccine in the 
fall of 2009. There are similar issues with the yeast system used for HPV vaccine, Gardasil. For 
these reasons, new technologies such as recombinant-protein-expression systems are being 
developed.  With time, these new technologies will be integrated into the formulation for any 
new vaccine.  These innovations will be assessed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Older vaccines are candidates for reformulation to improve potency, safety, and 
tolerability. In the case of inactivated polio vaccines, the addition of an immunostimulatory 
adjuvant may reduce the dose needed by 90% (PATH, 2010a). There is a 10% overfilling in vials 
to ensure a full dose is delivered. Some manufactures have been successful in reformulating 
vaccines into single dose delivery devices, extending the vaccine supply and strengthening the 
company’s competitive advantage. Despite the benefits, reformulations require a change to the 
manufacturing process and even new facilities.  Hence, new state-of-the-art manufacturing 
processes will be developed only if there is an attractive cost-benefit equation. The capital cost 
required for a manufacturing plant is an estimated 60% of vaccine production expense (Danzon,  
Pereira & Tejwani, 2005). MVCs have strong buying power and thus benefit from economies of 
scale on raw materials and services. Multinationals have built large production capacity for a 
chosen formulation and delivery device; therefore, switching costs are extremely high.   
To date, Sanofi-Pasteur is the only MVC to have brought an old vaccine into a new 
delivery device.  It was redesigned to differentiate the product in the competitive influenza 
vaccine market. 
Contract Manufacturing Organizations (CMOs) play a significant role in the vaccine 
manufacturing industry. These CMOs has developed specialized proprietary manufacturing 
processes that can address unmet production needs. Companies who engage in CMO activities, 
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such as Crucell, have established partnerships with multiple MVCs due to the efficiency of their 
proprietary manufacturing process (Crucell, 2010a).  Since there are a limited number of 
vaccines manufacturing CMOs, the demand for their services is high. Even though there are few 
companies able to provide this service, capital costs and operational complexities deter new 
companies from entering the market. Only a few CMOs are able to offer multiple services.  This 
is particularly problematic for biotechnology companies with limited access to manufacturing. 
Manufacturing methods must be determined early in the development process because, once 
locked in, switching costs are high. Biotechnology companies must therefore risk purchasing 
services from a CMO or partner with a MVC to access their manufacturing capacity. 
Some CMOs are beginning to reverse integrate on the vaccine value chain. CMOs in BRIC 
countries have built manufacturing capabilities over decades and are moving toward proprietary 
development of vaccines.  India’s Shantha and the China National Biotech Group are developing 
a new vaccine candidate for rotavirus in conjunction with the non-profit organization PATH 
(PATH, 2010b).  Such ability to reverse integrate may limit contract capacity as CMOs favour 
their own candidates. Even when there is capacity available in other parts of the world, 
differences in regulatory standards can limit the ability to manufacture elsewhere. 
The lack of additional capacity for vaccine manufacturing also limits an effective 
response in the case of a sudden need; this was evident during the recent shortages in the 
recent swine flu pandemic and the SARS outbreak in 2003.  Capacity issues present a major 
challenge to vaccine supply, but currently the costs of switching to methods that are more 
efficient prevents MVCs from doing this without external subsidies. 
Both MVCs and medium-sized companies in developing countries contribute to the 
current vaccine supply. In the following sections, we will examine the five MVCs and a selection 
of the mid-size companies.  We will review the contribution of their marketed products to 
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supply, drugs in development, and the strategies they use to maximize profit given the forces 
that impact the vaccine industry.    
2.2 Multinational Vaccine Companies 
The five MVCs share several common characteristics. Their large infrastructure and 
relative financial security enable them to afford the large costs of vaccine development.  
Vaccines form a relatively small, but growing part of the companies’ product portfolios.  They 
are expanding their vaccine businesses as countries look to vaccines to ensure public health in a 
cost-efficient way.  Below we describe the scale, focus and lead vaccine products of the MVCs.  
2.2.1 Sanofi Pasteur 
Sanofi Pasteur is the largest vaccine producer in the world. Its parent company, Sanofi-
Aventis is the third largest pharmaceutical company in the world. The company headquarters 
are located in Lyon, France. Sanofi-Pasteur employs over 12,500 people in more than 150 
countries. The company maintains full-scale development, manufacturing, and marketing 
capabilities. Multisite production facilities make it possible to access diversely skilled personal 
and utilize suppliers globally. The company owns eleven production and R&D sites in seven 
different countries, including India and China. Three new facilities are under development, two 
of them in emerging economies. Sanofi has accessed new capabilities and capacity through 
acquisitions (Sanofi Pasteur, 2010a). In 2008, they acquired the infectious disease vaccine 
developer Acambis plc for US $550 M (Martino, 2008). In 2009, the acquisition of Shantha 
Biotechnics of India for US $784 M allowed access to the emerging Indian market (Martino, 
2009). 
In 2009, Sanofi Pasteur produced and sold more than 1.6 billion vaccine doses. Their 
portfolio of products includes vaccines against 20 of the 26 bacterial and viral illnesses listed by 
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WHO as vaccine-preventable. By diversifying extensively, Sanofi has established a dominant 
position in the vaccine industry.  Sanofi differentiates itself from other MVCs as a low-cost, high-
volume producer (Sanofi Pasteur, 2010a). 
Investment in innovation has been critical to Sanofi’s success in new product 
development. Sanofi spends in excess of € 1 M per day on direct R&D activities. Currently, there 
are 28 new vaccines under development or at the approval stage. This pipeline includes vaccines 
for dengue and HIV, and next generation vaccines to replace existing suboptimal products for 
disease including Japanese encephalitis (Sanofi Pasteur, 2010b).  In 2009, Sanofi received 
European marketing authorization for the first intradermal microinjection system for seasonal 
flu vaccine (PharmaNews, 2009). Whether working alone or with other partners, Sanofi is 
developing innovative vaccines and delivery mechanisms. 
In Europe, Sanofi Pasteur markets their products through a joint venture with Merck 
and Company, while Aventis Pasteur was formed in 1994.  This JV has enabled the two 
companies to create new combination vaccines by sourcing components from one of the two 
entities that the other did not produce.  Aventis Pasteur MSD also markets the HPV vaccine in 
Europe (Silico, 2010). In 2008, this JV relationship allowed Sanofi to take more market share 
when production problems plagued Merck in 2008 (Edwards, 2009).  The JV also prevented the 
issue of shortages that can occur when vaccines come from a single manufacturer.  
To advance research initiatives, Sanofi has formed relationships with a wide range of 
universities, academic institutes, biopharmaceutical companies, and a number of public health 
organizations. Sanofi is a major partner in the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). Since 
1988, they have donated 120 million doses of oral polio vaccines towards this initiative. Over the 
past 30 years, Sanofi has been the sole international vaccine provider for meningitis, which 
causes large outbreaks in Africa annually (Sanofi-Aventis, 2010a).  By leveraging the partnerships 
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with organizations such as UNICEF, the WHO and GAVI, Sanofi is able to access populations 
throughout the world for enrolment in vaccine clinical trials. 
Along with becoming a major supplier of vaccines to UNICEF, Sanofi has gained access to 
sales directly from developing countries. With a first mover advantage, Sanofi has successfully 
established partnerships and production facilities within BRIC countries.  The successful 
acquisition of India’s Shantha Biotechnics was attributed to years of relationship building in the 
country. 
In 2009, Sanofi-Aventis reported total vaccine revenue of €3.5 B, a 19.2% increase at 
constant exchange rate from the previous year. Lead revenue generating products included 
influenza vaccines with total revenue of €1 B, paediatric and polio vaccine with €968 M, 
meningitis/pneumonia vaccines with revenue of €538 M, adult booster vaccines at €406 M, and 
travel/other vaccines at €509 M (Sanofi-Aventis 2010b). 
2.2.2 Merck & Co. Inc. 
Merck & Co. Inc. is one of world’s dominant pharmaceutical companies.  The company, 
headquartered in New Jersey, USA, employs over 55,000 people worldwide. As a global research 
driven pharmaceutical company, Merck maintains all the functions of the vaccine value chain. 
Though company’s main focus has been pharmaceutical drugs, in recent years it has increased 
development efforts for vaccines. In 2009, the company had a 25% share of the world’s vaccine 
revenue.  Strong research capabilities and global access to suppliers have enabled Merck to 
bring high-value vaccines to market (Merck 2010a). 
Merck has an extensive portfolio of vaccine products and many products in its 
development pipeline.  Merck is the first and only company to have developed a vaccine against 
shingles. Zostavax is a live vaccine that reduced the incidence of shingles by 51.3% in a clinical 
trial of over 38,000 adults. Currently, Zostavax is recommended for adults over the age of 60, 
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including individuals who have suffered from prior episodes of shingles (Medical News Today, 
2005a). 
In developing RotaTeq, a vaccine against rotavirus, Merck conducted a clinical trial with 
70,000 subjects to prove statistically that this vaccine is safe.  This was one of the largest clinical 
trials ever conducted.  A post licensure three-year study with 44,000 children also monitored 
any adverse effects associated with the vaccine. Large trial size and long-term monitoring stem 
from tighten regulatory guidelines resulting from Wyeth’s withdrawal of Rotashield vaccine. 
Rotashield had a suspected association with intussusceptions, a rare condition leading to 
blockage or twisting of the small intestine (Margaret & Rennels, 2000).  No small- or mid-size 
vaccine development company could have afforded to run such a large trial.  Due to Merck’s 
efforts, the FDA granted approval for RotaTeq in 2006; the product had sales of US$ 523 M in 
2009 (Merck, 2010b).  
Merck’s Gardasil, the vaccine against the human papillomavirus (HPV) is one of the 
recent success stories in vaccines that have reawakened interest in the industry.  Infection by 
HPV is a known cause of cervical cancer. In the US alone, there were 11,270 new cases of 
cervical cancer in 2009. Clinical trials demonstrated that Gardasil prevented more than 70% of 
these cases. Health care authorities quickly began to include Gardasil as part of national 
immunization schedules, contributing to rapid market penetration.  Gardasil gained FDA and 
EMEA approval in 2006 and is now approved in over 100 countries worldwide. Due to the high 
cost of the vaccine regimen, it has still not reached low-income countries.  GSK released a 
competing HPV vaccine in 2007, but Merck’s first-to-market advantage created revenue of 
almost US $2 B that year. The basis of the Merck’s HPV vaccines are the patent rights obtained 
from a cross licensing agreement with GSK in 2005 (Grimes, 2006). This strategic alliance had 
enabled Merck to build a lucrative HPV vaccine franchise. 
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Merck’s vaccine pipeline includes a next generation HPV vaccine, currently in phase III 
trials.  The candidate, V503, protects against nine strains of the HPV virus. The development 
work for V503 is being carried out under licensing partnerships with several companies; this 
includes a relationship with CSL Ltd., an Australian vaccine manufacturer who originally 
developed the Gardasil vaccine. Merck also manufactures and sells this vaccine in Europe 
through its joint venture with Sanofi-Pasteur, Sanofi-Pasteur MSD. 
Merck has several other promising alliances and licenses that enrich its vaccine pipeline.  
In 2004, Merck and Intercell formed a worldwide, exclusive commercial alliance to develop a 
bacterial vaccine against methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections. A 
second, licensing and collaborative agreement with Dynavax is aimed at developing a new 
investigational Hepatitis b (Hep B) vaccine, Heplisav. This vaccine is currently in phase III trials. 
With this agreement, Merck funds all the developmental activities in return for worldwide 
exclusive right to the vaccine, if Dynavax is successful. 
In addition to successes, in recent years Merck has experienced manufacturing 
difficulties related to Varicella, which is required for the production of Varicella Zoster virus-
containing vaccines, such as Varivax, ProQuad and Zostavax. Merck has struggled with ongoing 
shortages of Zostavax since 2008 (CDC, 2010a).  The company has also had sterility issues with 
Hib and Hep B vaccines (Edwards, 2008). Merck will need to engage in partnerships and 
acquisitions to attract new technologies and build manufacturing capacity in these areas.  
Merck has been relatively slow in engaging in such relationships within developing 
countries. The company established a joint venture in 2009 with The Wellcome Trust, to form 
MSD Welcome Trust Hilleman Laboratories in India.  Hilleman Labs focuses on developing low-
cost affordable vaccines for diseases affecting people in the poorest regions of the world. In 
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addition, Merck has provided RotaTeq to countries eligible for the GAVI Fund at cost (Merck, 
2010c). 
Merck has successfully differentiated with a vaccine portfolio that commands high 
market prices. This has enabled Merck to capture almost the same market share as Sanofi-
Pasteur, with a much lower number of vaccine doses sold. In 2009, Merck & Co reported total 
revenue of US $27.4 B, which included US $3.6 B vaccine revenues.  This was a 12.2% decrease 
from the previous year and due in part to Gardasil’s decrease in revenue from US $1.4 B to $1.1 
B. This loss can be attributed to competition from GSK’s Cervarix, as well as market saturation 
amongst the target population for vaccination. ProQuqdéM-M-R II/Varivax was the highest 
revenue generator at US $1.3B.  
2.2.3  GlaxoSmithKline plc (GSK) 
In 2000, Glaxo Wellcome PLC and SmithKline Beecham PLC merged to form the UK-
based company GlaxoSmithKline plc (GSK). GSK employs over 100,000 people worldwide in 116 
countries.  1,600 scientists work on vaccine R&D.  Currently, the company holds 16 different 
vaccines in clinical development and 25 different vaccines in the market.  In 2009, GSK produced 
1.4 billion doses of vaccines; 1 billion were sold in the developing world. GSK sells some of these 
vaccines at differential prices in lower-income markets.  GSK supplied 21.2% of the world 
vaccines needs in 2009(GSK, 2010a). 
Vaccine development work primarily occurs in the biologics centre, located in Rixensart, 
Belgium. Three other GSK sites and two joint ventures in China and Russia support additional 
large-scale manufacturing. 
Two key acquisitions in 2005, ID Biomedical (ID) for $1.7 B and Corixa for $300 M 
increased GSK’s manufacturing capacity and added innovative vaccine complements 
(DrugResearcher.com, 2005). ID developed innovative vaccines and had large manufacturing 
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capacity. In 2004, ID acquired the influenza vaccine related assets of Shire Pharmaceuticals. This 
transaction included a 200,000 square foot influenza vaccine manufacturing and fill/finish 
facility in Quebec with production capacity of 40-50 million doses per year.  A 68,000 square 
foot vaccine research centre in Quebec and a vaccine development and pilot manufacturing 
facility in Massachusetts were also acquired in the agreement. The ID acquisition significantly 
increased GSK’s vaccine manufacturing capacity in North America (Medical News Today, 2005b). 
The second company acquired in 2005 had previously collaborated with GSK to discover 
cancer and infectious disease antigens for vaccines. Corixa developed and produced 
Monophosphoryl Lipid A (MPL), a novel adjuvant used in many of the vaccines in GSK's 
development pipeline at that time (DrugResearcher.com, 2005).  Adjuvants can reduce the 
amount of vaccine needed for a protective immune response by as much as 90%, allowing 
significant cost of goods savings. GSK’s HPV vaccine, Cervarix included MPL and was the first 
vaccine with a new adjuvant approved by the FDA.  This was a significant milestone for the 
vaccine industry, as the FDA was very conservative about the new adjuvant.  RTS,S , a MPL 
containing vaccine targeting the malaria is currently in phase III clinical trials.   
In the past two decades, GSK has invested over US $300 M for developing a vaccine 
against malaria. RTS,S is the most developed vaccine candidate to malaria .  RTS,S has a lower 
efficacy than required of most other vaccines, but given that an estimated 300 million people 
are infected with malaria annually, the lower efficacy is still valuable and the market large. GSK 
hopes to receive regulatory approval for RTS,S vaccine in 2012 (GSK, 2010b). 
GSK has been conducting HIV vaccine research for the past two decades. In 
collaboration with the Pasteur Institute, GSK’s strategy is to develop a vaccine by fusing HIV 
genes with a highly potent measles vaccine. While this collaboration is in progress, GSK is 
developing their own candidate F4co, which is currently in phase I and II clinical development. 
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The company has also established extramural R&D collaborations to identify HIV envelope-
based proteins for which vaccines can be developed (GSK, 2010b). Hence, the company’s clear 
strategy is to build a pipeline with both internal and external developmental programs. 
GSK has taken an active role in technology transfer and partnership formation in the 
developing countries.  Currently there is a network of 13 vaccine production sites in 12 different 
countries working with GSK.  A long-term partnership with Brazil’s Oswaldo Cruz Foundation 
(Fiocruz) had provided technology to manufacture vaccines for public health priorities in Brazil 
including polio, Hib, measles, mumps, rubella, rotavirus, and most recently pneumococcal 
disease. In return, GSK has gained exclusive access to the Brazilian market.  Since 2007, 50 
million doses of GSK’s Rotarix vaccine have been delivered through the technology transfer 
agreement with Fiocruz.  Since 2009, GSK had made inroads into the Chinese vaccine market 
through a joint venture with Shenzhen Neptunus Interlong Bio-Technique Co. Ltd (Shenzhen 
Neptunus). This joint venture will focus on developing and manufacturing influenza vaccines for 
the Chinese market.  Both companies will benefit through building joint expertise in vaccine 
development. GSK will provide access to its adjuvant, while Shenzhen Neptunus will provide 
local manufacturing capacity and R&D expertise (GSK, 2010c). 
GSK became one of the first vaccine manufactures to sign an agreement with the GAVI 
Alliance on an Advanced Market Commitment (AMC) program for pneumococcal vaccine. GSK 
committed to the supply of 300 million doses of the pneumococcal vaccine Synflorix over 10 
years.  A newly built US $600 M vaccine manufacturing plant in Singapore will manufacture the 
majority of this pneumococcal vaccine, starting in 2011 (Medical News Today, 2009a). The 
Singapore site was built because of the guaranteed demand provided by the AMC. 
In 2009, GSK reported £3.7 B in vaccine revenue, a 30% increase at constant exchange 
rates from 2008. Pandemic influenza vaccines were the main revenue generator, contributing 
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£883 M. Hepatitis vaccine revenue fell 11% to £665 M. Infanrix/Pediarix also fell by 15% to £649 
M because of competing multivalent vaccine products. Cervarix, the competing product of 
Merck’s Gardasil, increased market penetration with a 38% increase in revenues to £187 M, in 
part due to sales from their exclusive supply agreement with Brazil.  Rotarix increased sales 50% 
to generate £282 M. Since 2007, GSK has invested over £1 B in expanding influenza vaccine 
manufacturing capacity as part of signing the largest pandemic flu vaccine contract in history 
with the UK government (GSK, 2010d). 
2.2.4 Pfizer 
Pfizer, with corporate headquarters in New York City, US and 116,500 employees 
worldwide, is the world’s largest pharmaceutical company (Pfizer, 2010a). Revenues in 2009 
were US $50 B.  Despite their dominance in the drug industry, Pfizer does not have a history of 
developing vaccines.  This began to change in 2006 with their acquisition of PowderMed, a 
company with a DNA-based vaccine technology.  At the time of the PowderMed acquisition, 
Pfizer publicly stated that further vaccine related acquisitions would be forthcoming (Pollack, 
2006). In 2008, Pfizer acquired Coley Pharmaceutical Group for US $230 M. Coley had two key 
values, a vaccine adjuvant technology and a new class of immunomodulatory drug candidates 
(The Medical News, 2007).  Their most notable acquisition was Wyeth; purchased for US $68 B 
in 2009, this was the largest pharmaceutical acquisition in history.  With this purchase, Pfizer 
gained its first marketed vaccine, Prevnar 7. 
The acquisition of Wyeth gave the new organization manufacturing facilities in 10 
different countries.  In May 2010, the company announced a workforce reduction of 6000 
employees in manufacturing to increase operational efficiency.  Though the company reaffirmed 
its commitment to growing biopharmaceuticals and vaccines, it stated: 
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“…the company also proposes changes at its sites that manufacture 
vaccines and large molecule medicines to improve efficiencies, capitalize on 
process and productivity improvements and new technology, and to simplify the 
supply chain.” (Pfizer, 2010b) 
 
The authors see this as part of a larger effort to find ways to reduce the 
significant cost of manufacturing vaccines. 
Worldwide sales for Prevnar 7, a vaccine used to prevent pneumococcal disease in 
children, was US $2.9 B in 2009. In 2010, the company gained regulatory approval from the FDA 
for their second-generation vaccine against pneumococcal disease, Prevnar-13.  As of March 
2010, 40 countries have approved Prevnar-13 for use (Pfizer, 2010c).  This vaccine is considered 
to be the most complex ever marketed, with 13 different molecules each requiring individual 
formulation and attachment to immunostimulants.  This is reflected in its market cost of over US 
$400 for the standard 4-dose immunization.  This vaccine is undergoing trials for prevention of 
pneumococcal disease in adults, an indication that could add another US $1.5 B to annual 
revenues (Wilson, 2010).  Pfizer has no other marketed vaccines, but does have vaccines in 
phase 1 against Staphylococcus aureus and phase II trial against meningococcal B vaccine in 
infants (Pfizer, 2010d). 
Pfizer’s history with the developing countries has been limited.  They have donated 
antibiotics to countries for the prevention of river blindness through the International Trachoma 
Initiative.  In 2008, Pfizer entered into collaboration with Grameen Bank of Bangladesh to 
address unmet medical needs in the country (Pfizer, 2010e).   The company formed an Emerging 
Markets Business Unit during their reorganization after the Wyeth organization.  However, their 
first foray into differential pricing of their products for low- or middle-income countries 
occurred in March of this year, when they signed a contract with the GAVI Alliance’s 
Pneumococcal AMC.  This program provides initial subsidy to the manufacturer in exchange for 
the commitment of long-term production and lower prices overall. Pfizer committed to produce 
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30 million doses for the AMC over the next 10 years. In Pfizer’s press release regarding the AMC 
commitment, they state that they will increase manufacturing capacity for the vaccine to meet 
the commitment (Pfizer, 2010b; Pfizer, 2010c). Acquisitions in emerging markets and 
freestanding differential pricing agreements have not yet formed part of Pfizer’s strategy, but 
the Emerging Markets Business may change this. 
2.2.5 Novartis 
Novartis, founded in 1895 and based in Basel, Switzerland, is a global pharmaceutical 
company with over 99,800 employees in 140 countries worldwide. The company operates four 
divisions: pharmaceuticals, vaccines and diagnostics, generics and biosimilars, and consumer 
health. Novartis holds 8% of the vaccine market. 
The vaccines and diagnostics division was established following Novartis’s 2006 
acquisition of Chiron Corporation for US $5.4 B. At the time of acquisition, Chiron was the fifth 
largest vaccine developer and the second largest influenza vaccine producer in the world, with 
manufacturing facilities in Europe, the United States, and Asia (Medical News Today, 2006).  
The current portfolio of products includes vaccines to prevent influenza, meningitis, Hib, 
rabies, Japanese encephalitis, tick-borne encephalitis, polio, diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis 
(whooping cough). Novartis’ vaccines in development include two-phase II vaccines and five 
phase III products (Novartis, 2010a). In March of 2010, Novartis received European approval for 
a Menveo, the first quadrivalent conjugate vaccine against meningococcal disease. The FDA 
approved this vaccine targeting preventable N. Meningitidis serogroups A, C, W-135 and Y in 
February of 2010 (Novartis, 2010b). 
Novartis is the first company in the world that commercially produces vaccines by 
utilizing mammalian cell cultures; this technology uses their proprietary cell line to produce viral 
components. In 2007, Novartis received the European approval for Optaflu, an influenza vaccine 
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manufactured by mammalian cell culture.  Clinical trials showed equivalency to egg produced 
influenza vaccines in terms of efficacy, safety, and tolerability. According to Novartis, this is the 
first major innovation in the influenza vaccine manufacturing process. This system enabled 
Novartis to respond with faster and more flexible manufacturing in to the recent H1N1 
pandemic. Celtura, which was produced with this technology, was one of the first H1N1 vaccines 
to be marketed in 2009 (Novartis, 2010a).  Cell culture manufacturing is carried out in Marburg, 
Germany, while a new facility is being built in North Carolina, US. We will discuss the importance 
of this innovation further in Chapter 3. 
Novartis has also pioneered reverse vaccinology (Rinaudo, 2009); this technology uses 
sequence information of pathogens to identify targets that other antigen identification methods 
cannot.  It may find antigens that produce a protective response even if the individual is later 
infected with a different variant of the pathogen. Novartis’s meningitis B candidate was 
developed using this technology.  This vaccine is currently in phase III trials in adults and phase II 
in infants. 
Like all the other MVCs, Novartis formed strategic partnerships to gain new product 
candidates and technologies.  In 2008, Novartis entered into a partnership with AlphaVax, giving 
it exclusive global rights to AlphaVax’s investigational Cytomegalovirus (CMV) vaccine program. 
This agreement also gave Novartis first rights to AlphaVax’s preclinical respiratory syncytial virus 
(RSV) program (Novartis, 2008).  The CMV vaccine is currently undergoing phase II clinical trials. 
In recent years, Novartis has taken an active role in fighting disease affecting the 
developing world.  Through partnerships with the WHO, UNICEF, and the Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO), Novartis has provided millions of vaccine doses to developing countries at 
an affordable cost through price differentiation.  Around 70% of the 800 million vaccines doses 
produced annually are destined for developing world countries. Since 2006, 100 million doses of 
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Quinvaxem have been distributed in 50 developing countries. This vaccine was developed 
through a partnership with United Nations and Crucell.  It is one of the few vaccines designed by 
a MVC for the developing world.  Quinvaxem is used to protect infants and toddlers against 
diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (whooping cough), Hep b, and Hib.  A commitment towards 
fighting disease affecting developing countries is further evident from the Novartis Vaccines 
Institute for Global Health (NVGH). This NFP organization collaborates with scientists globally to 
develop vaccines against neglected disease (Novartis, 2010c). 
In 2009, the Novartis Vaccine & Diagnostics Division reported revenue of US $2.4 B.  This 
was a 39% increase at constant exchange rates from 2008. The pandemic vaccine for H1N1 was 
the main revenue generator, contributing US $790 M to revenue (Novartis, 2010d). 
2.3 Mid-Size Vaccine Companies 
While the five multinational companies described above account for most of the 
revenue from the vaccine industry, mid-size vaccine firms can occupy profitable specialist niches 
that also benefit emerging economies. 
In the developed world, a few smaller vaccine manufacturers have avoided acquisition 
by MVCs.  These firms tend to form partnerships with several of the MVCs, which would 
complicate acquisition by any one firm.   Their strategic relationships with the five MVCS are 
based on proprietary innovations of the smaller partner. These innovations often lower the cost 
of production or ease of use of the vaccine, and therefore have utility for the developing world. . 
Over the last 25 years, many emerging economies have built national vaccine 
manufacturing infrastructure.  Today, India, China, and Brazil each have multiple vaccine 
manufacturers that supply vaccines to their large domestic markets.  These companies typically 
produce low-cost vaccines that are second-generation products based on MVC products.  The 
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WHO recognizes both Brazilian and Indian NRAs.  Manufacturers in these countries can now 
apply for WHO pre-qualification so that they may also sell their vaccines to UNICEF, which 
purchases 40% of all vaccines manufactured worldwide.    
Middle-income country manufacturers are just beginning to innovate in vaccine 
development.  Sales from India and other emerging economies to UNICEF have placed 
innovation and price pressures on MVCs based in high-income countries.  As an example, the 
average cost of the pentavalent vaccine in 2010, after two Indian manufacturers began sales to 
UNICEF, dropped by an estimated 20% from that paid in 2004 (Singh, 2009).  Some MVCs have 
responded to this threat by forming long-term strategic alliances or made acquisitions with 
vaccine manufacturers in these emerging economies. 
2.3.1 Developed Country Producers 
2.3.1.1 Crucell 
Crucell is headquartered in the Netherlands.  The company achieved revenues of € 
358M and a net profit of € 23.9M in 2009.  The company has a proprietary high-yield production 
process for biological compound drugs.  They also manufacture their own vaccines and proteins.  
Crucell has strategic alliances with Merck, Novartis, Sanofi-Pasteur, and Wyeth for vaccine 
manufacture using the Per.C6 production technology.  Crucell’s vaccine production is focussed 
on production of vaccines that meet developing world needs. Quinvaxem is Crucell’s lead 
vaccine product, with 64.3 million doses sold in 2009.  The vaccine is made in collaboration with 
Novartis, who manufacturers 4 of the 5 components of the vaccine.  Final production occurs in 
Crucell’s Korean manufacturing facilities.  Quinvaxem is part of the WHO Expanded Program on 
Immunization (EPI) and received a renewal procurement contract with UNICEF for product 
worth an estimated US $300 M over the period of 2010-2012.  There is no quantity obligation 
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for UNICEF in this agreement, and the amount is US $200 M less than Crucell received for the 
procurement period of 2007-2009. This occurred as two Indian manufacturers gained 
prequalification for their pentavalent formulations.  UNICEF offered tenders to these new 
entrants to reduce the risk of sufficient procurement of the vaccine and to lower the vaccine 
price.  UNICEF is the major purchaser of this vaccine.  Crucell shares fell after UNICEF’s bid to 
Indian manufacturers was announced (Block, 2009).  However, in May, UNICEF recommended 
the recall of Shantha’s pentavalent vaccine due to manufacturing problems; Crucell gained an 
additional US $110 M contract concurrently with this announcement.  While this has alleviated 
concerns about competition in the short term, emerging country manufacturers will continue to 
place competitive pressure on Crucell‘s lead product. 
While Crucell is headquartered in the Netherlands, the main manufacturing site is in 
Korea.  While this country is now considered high-income by GNI, the company has found it 
financially beneficial to be situated there.  The company completed construction of its 
manufacturing facility in the Incheon Free Economic Zone in Korea this year.  Investment at this 
site allows ‘tax holidays’, reducing deferred tax liabilities by €2.1 million (Crucell, 2010b). 
2.3.1.2 Intercell 
This mid-sized vaccine manufacturer is based in Vienna, Austria, with manufacturing 
facilities in Scotland.  The company achieved revenues of € 61.7 M in 2009, with a net loss of 
€18.4 M.  Novartis AG owns 14.9% of shares and markets Intercell's first approved vaccine.  They 
also have a strategic alliance with GSK for their vaccine patch technology and are developing 
vaccines with Merck. 
Their Japanese Encephalitis vaccine, IXIARO, gained regulatory approval from both the 
FDA and EMEA in the first quarter of 2010.  In May, they signed a five-year exclusive contract for 
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the supply of the vaccine to the US Department of Defence.  IXIARO generated € 7.7 M in 
revenue in 2009.  Intercell has also generated an agreement with the manufacturer Biological E., 
to manufacture a product based on IXIARO that will be marketed in India and other 
neighbouring countries (Intercell, 2010).  Japanese encephalitis is endemic to India and many 
other emerging economies, so this agreement allows Intercell to access a lower-margin, but 
higher volume market. 
In addition to a focus on sales to the military, the company is targeting their products 
towards the general travellers market.  This includes a vaccine for traveller’s diarrhoea, a 
vaccine in phase III trials that uses a needle free patch method of administration.  This delivery 
innovation was the basis of a strategic alliance agreement signed with GSK at the end of 2009. 
The companies will also develop needle-free, patch-based vaccines from GSK’s pipeline of new 
clinical candidates. GSK paid €33.6 M upfront for this agreement, and may invest up to €84 M 
additionally (Intercell, 2010).  Vaccine patches also have the potential for high demand in low- 
and middle- income countries; we will their benefit in more detail in Chapter 3. 
2.3.2 Indian Vaccine Industry Overview 
Indian vaccine companies have repeatedly entered the market with low-price vaccine 
offerings that have forced significant discounting of MVC product in the country.  National 
manufacturers often release competitor vaccines to the same disease within a few weeks of 
each other.  There is the intense vaccine manufacturing competition within the country.  With 
the recent achievement of WHO prequalification status by multiple Indian companies, price 
competition is now appearing for products of interest to the world’s largest vaccine purchaser, 
UNICEF.  Below we will describe the largest vaccine manufacturers in India, their current 
products and the influence on pricing. 
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2.3.2.1 Serum Institute of India (SII) 
Founded in 1966 to increase access to vaccines within the country, SII has grown to 
become the world’s largest supplier of measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) combination 
vaccines as well as DTP.  Two out of every three children in the world have received a vaccine 
generated at SII.  The company exports to over 140 countries (Serum Institute, 2009).  Within 
India, the institute is the largest supplier of vaccines paid for by the Indian government.  In 2007, 
the organization launched a proprietary Hib vaccine. They began selling the product at US $8 per 
dose, which undercut the price of global manufacturers Wyeth, GSK and Sanofi by 50-70% 
(Unnikrishnan, 2007). 
2.3.2.2 Panacea 
Panacea developed their first vaccine production plant in 1988, and in 2002, they built a 
facility for recombinant vaccine production.  In 2004, the company formed a joint venture with 
Chiron (now Novartis) to market vaccines within India.  Panacea’s Hep B vaccine and several of 
their multivalent vaccine types are WHO prequalified.  In 2009, they also received a UNICEF 
tender for production of pentavalent vaccine, worth US $222 M.  The company’s vaccine 
department had revenues of Rupees 66.8 B (approx. US $1.6 B) in the fiscal year ending March 
31st, 2010.  Panacea is the second largest manufacturer of vaccines in India. The completion of 
their formulations facility in Baddi, India in 2009 has allowed a capacity of 1 billion vaccine doses 
annually (Panacea, 2009).  Table 3 summarizes the capabilities of Panacea’s vaccine production 
facilities.  Their volume capacity and variety of manufacturing technologies rivals that of any 
MVC. 
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Table 3: Panacea Vaccine Manufacturing Facilities 
 
Source, Panacea, 2009 
2.3.2.3 Shantha 
Shantha was founded in 1993 with a mandate to be the first Indian manufacturer to 
produce a proprietary vaccine.  The successful launch of this Hep B vaccine occurred in 1997.  
Shantha sold the product at one tenth of the price of products from multinational 
manufacturers, profoundly affecting market price for competitive formulations.  Today, the 
company supplies almost 50% of the global Hep B vaccine demand. 
In 2007, the NFP organization PATH approached Shantha to develop a rotavirus vaccine 
that could be purchased in India and other emerging markets.  PATH chose Shantha due to its 
technological and business abilities, as well as the organization’s prior success with achieving 
WHO prequalification status for their vaccines (Business Standard, 2007).  In 2009, Shantha was 
awarded a three year contract with UNICEF for its SHAN5 pentavalent vaccine worth an 
estimated US $340 M.  This contract was the lasted demonstration of the sophistication of 
Shantha’s vaccine formulation expertise, though the product has since been under scrutiny for 
manufacturing irregularities. 
In 2008, Shantha achieved revenues of US $33 M (Biotechnology Journal, 2009).  The 
Merieux Alliance acquired a 60% stake in the company in 2006, and in 2009, Sanofi-Aventis 
Panacea Facility name Vaccine Capabilities Notes
Baddi- Vaccine Formulation Several filling lines with WHO compliance capacity of 1B doses/year
Filling line for prefilled syringes
New Delhi- Vaccine formulation Two vial filling lines for OPV
One vial filling line for Hepatitis B Vaccine and combination vaccines WHO Prequalification expected 2010
One line ready for pre-filled injection devices
Lalru- Bulk Vaccines Facility 1 Recombinant antigen production- Hepatitis B
Pneumococcal polysaccharide production for candidate vaccine
Lalru- Bulk Vaccines Facility 2 Production of tetanus toxoid for conjugation
Production of bacterial vaccine antigens- diptheria toxoid, pertussis
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acquired Shantha from Merieux for US $784 M.  This was the first acquisition of an Indian 
manufacturer by an MVC, but it is likely others will follow to access low-cost manufacturing. 
2.3.2.4 Indian Immunologicals 
This company is one of only a few nationally owned vaccine manufacturers in India.  It is 
a subsidiary of the National Dairy Development Board, and develops vaccines for veterinary and 
medical purposes.  While not WHO prequalified, the company sells its rabies vaccine, Abhayrab 
directly to over 30 countries (Indian Immunologicals Ltd., 2010).  To maximize demand of the 
vaccine, the company supplies over 1500 clinics in India with fridges for proper cold storage, and 
is expanding this system to other rural Indian communities and countries (Frew et al., 2007).  
2.3.3 Chinese Vaccine Industry 
This government owned company is the largest vaccine manufacturer in China.  It is 
comprised of six Institutes of Biological Products and two trading companies.  They produce 
blood derivatives, biopharmaceuticals and diagnostics in addition to vaccines.  The National 
Vaccine and Serum Institute subsidiary was formed in 1919. The corporation produced 800 
million doses of vaccine and made worldwide revenues of US $372 M in 2005 (DCVMN, 2007).  
More recent information is not published.  The company has development collaborations for 
rotavirus and pneumococcal vaccines with PATH (PATH, 2007; PATH, 2009). In 1988, the 
Chengdu Institute of Biological Products began to market a vaccine against Japanese 
encephalitis within China.  For the last 10 years, the company has sold this vaccine to other 
countries where JE is endemic, including Nepal and South Korea.  Recently, price differentiation 
was established to allow low-income countries to access the vaccine. Filing for WHO 
prequalification has been submitted; pending approval, this vaccine may receive demand from 
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global travellers and military markets, creating an opportunity for high-margin sales (PATH, 
2008). 
2.3.3.1 China National Biotec Group (CNBG) 
This government owned company is the largest vaccine manufacturer in China.  It is 
comprised of six Institutes of Biological Products and two trading companies.  They produce 
blood derivatives, biopharmaceuticals and diagnostics in addition to vaccines.  The National 
Vaccine and Serum Institute subsidiary was formed in 1919. The corporation produced 800 
million doses of vaccine and made worldwide revenues of US $372 M in 2005 (DCVMN, 2007).  
The company has development collaborations for rotavirus and pneumococcal vaccines with 
PATH (PATH, 2007; PATH, 2009). In 1988, the Chengdu Institute of Biological Products began to 
market a vaccine against Japanese encephalitis within China.  For the last 10 years, the company 
has sold this vaccine to other countries where JE is endemic, including Nepal and South Korea.  
Recently, price differentiation was established to allow low-income countries to access the 
vaccine. Filing for WHO prequalification has been submitted; pending approval, this vaccine may 
receive demand from global travellers and military markets, creating an opportunity for high-
margin sales (PATH, 2008). 
2.3.3.2 Sinovac 
Sinovac is a privately owned vaccine manufacturer registered on the NASDAQ in the US.  
It has a demonstrated capacity for innovation, collaborating with the US CDC to develop a SARS 
and H5N1 influenza vaccine.  In 2009, the company realized a gross profit of US $64 M (Sinovac, 
2010). 
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2.3.4 Brazilian Vaccine Industry 
Brazil has a long history of nationalized vaccine production.  The country gained 
expertise in yellow fever vaccine generation over 70 years ago when they received a technology 
transfer from the Rockefeller Foundation.  The drive for national vaccine production capacity 
continued with the initiation of the National Program for Self-Sufficiency in Immunobiologicals 
(PASNI) in 1983 (Homma, 2008).  This program was designed to increase the percentage of 
vaccines produced within the country’s borders by investing in vaccine manufacturing 
infrastructure.  Brazil is very progressive in adopting vaccines; in 2006, it became the first 
country to include GSK’s new oral rotavirus vaccine into their public health program (Wecker, 
2006). Today, Brazil has two dominant state-owned vaccine manufacturers that supply the 
public market - Bio Manguinhos and the Butantan Institute.  The two organizations are under 
legal obligation not to compete with one another so that a greater variety of vaccines are 
manufactured in the country. 
2.3.4.1 Bio Manguinhos 
Brazil’s efforts to develop manufacturing expertise through PASNI has paid dividends, 
with Bio Manguinhos receiving WHO prequalification status in 2001 for yellow fever vaccine.  
This allowed sale of yellow fever vaccine to the supranational organization, which is one of the 
globe’s largest purchasers of vaccines.  As of 2007, Brazil produced over 80% of yellow fever 
vaccine supplies for the world with an estimated 16 million units sold that year (Fiocruz, 2007b); 
More recent sales statistics are not available.   Bio Manguinhos is also prequalified to produce 
the meningococcal A&C vaccine (Homma, 2009). 
In 2008, Bio Manguinhos signed a technology transfer agreement with GSK for their 
pneumococcal vaccine, Synflorix.  In return for the technology transfer, Brazil committed to 
purchase Synflorix at pre-determined prices over the next 8 years providing a large market for 
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the vaccine (Neto & Jayaraman, 2009).  This marked the fourth such agreement that had been 
signed between the pharmaceutical company and Bio Manguinhos for vaccines since 1985; prior 
agreements covered oral poliomyelitis vaccine, Hib and a measles, mumps, and rubella trivalent 
vaccine (Fiocruz, 2008).  GSK’s historical relationship with Brazil’s nationalized manufacturers 
gave an advantage to the manufacturer for this negotiation.  This was especially positive for 
GSK, as Pfizer has just gained US approval for Prevnar-13, a pneumococcal vaccine that provides 
protection against 3 additional strains of the bacteria that Synflorix does not cover.  Bio also 
cited GSK’s willingness to negotiate on price as key to forming this partnership (Neto & 
Jayaraman, 2009).  As this is a nationalized vaccine manufacturer, sales figures are not available. 
2.3.5 Other Emerging Country Vaccine Manufacturers 
2.3.5.1 PT Bio Farma 
PT Bio Farma is a nationally owned firm with the predominant mandate of producing 
vaccine for the domestic market.   Most of Bio Farma’s vaccines produced are WHO 
prequalified.  The company has manufacturing capacity of over 1 billion doses per year.   In 
2000, the company completed development of a facility to produce a novel delivery device, 
Uniject.  This innovation came from a partnership with Becton Dickinson, UNICEF and Programs 
for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH).  Today, the company produces tetanus toxoid and 
Hep B vaccines in Uniject (PT Bio Farma, 2010). On June 18, 2010, PT signed a memorandum of 
understanding to develop vaccines with Medicago of Singapore.  This company has a ‘virus-like’ 
particle technology that is one of the newest technology platforms for vaccine development 
(Biospectrum, 2010). 
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2.4 Summary 
Over the last 10 years, the value of vaccines has been reconsidered by the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Firms of sufficient size to manage the massive clinical trials and capital 
investment demands of manufacturing have yielded high returns on their marketed vaccines. 
These profits often last well beyond patent expiry, as manufacturing expertise is rare enough 
that generics have not yet become a threat.  Today’s vaccine profits remain highly concentrated 
amongst these firms. Through partnerships and acquisition of small- and medium-size 
companies, MVCs are further expanding into the industry. These activities were once limited to 
developed country markets, but today MVCs are making some inroads into emerging 
economies. 
While MVCs have the highest profit margins, manufacturers in emerging economies 
surpass them in doses produced.  Moreover, emerging country manufacturers are starting to 
broaden their value chains both backwards - into research and development - and forward, into 
clinical trials and marketing.  These additional value chain links will enable them to compete 
against the current MVCs. Where emerging country manufacturers develop vaccines to 
regionally endemic diseases, they may dominate regional market share.  Other countries with 
middle-class private buyers, in addition to demand from military and foreign travellers may 
allow high profit margins for ‘regional disease’ vaccines.  In addition to the development of new 
vaccines, MVCS and smaller companies alike are developing new techniques for vaccine 
manufacture and formulations that will dramatically lower cost of goods.  This will in turn, open 
up new market segments.  Innovations may lower barriers to entry and change the trend 
towards industry consolidation.  We will discuss the impact of innovation on the industry in 
Chapter 3. 
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3: INNOVATION AS A DRIVER OF THE VACCINE INDUSTRY 
Scientific and technological innovations have advanced the re-emergence of the vaccine 
industry.  These advances include a better understanding of the human immune system, 
increased screening capabilities for antigen identification and improved formulations. The aim 
of this chapter is to gain an understanding of innovations and technological improvements in 
vaccine development and manufacturing processes. We will also introduce new vaccine 
formulations and delivery methods that are adding value and increasing accessibility to vaccines. 
 When Wyeth marketed Prevnar in 2000, the vaccine’s multibillion-dollar annual 
revenues motivated other companies to enter the industry.  Because of their importance for 
public health, wealthy governments have also invested heavily in innovations that improve 
vaccine supply. Today there are innovations occurring in all segments of the vaccine value chain. 
The majority of commoditized vaccines have been successfully developed through simple 
manufacturing processes. However, vaccine development for many of the current pathogens is 
difficult and expensive.  While there are sustained innovations for improving or extending the 
life cycle of current vaccine products, new disruptive technologies can revolutionize the industry 
by enabling products that developing countries can afford (Bower & Christensen, 1997). DNA 
vaccines, discussed below, are a likely candidate for disruptive innovation in this industry.  
The book Open Innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) describes the paradigm shift from a 
closed-innovation to an open-innovation model. In the closed model, R&D projects are launched 
based on the knowledge and technology base of the company. The beginning and end of 
projects are also determined internally. In this model, technology development projects can 
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only originate within the company. Economies of scale and scope of internal innovation give rise 
to vertically integrated companies that internalize the entire value chain. More recently, 
companies have been following an open model of innovation. Here, technology development 
can originate from either internal or external sources.  Importantly, innovations can be captured 
from many sources including technology transfer, licensing and partnerships. Open innovation is 
apparent in the vaccine industry today.  The majority of MVCs are looking to smaller 
biotechnology firms to gain access to new vaccine development projects, research techniques 
and newer manufacturing processes. The MVC’s own research allows them to absorb the inflow 
of knowledge from external sources. Intellectual property is used as a class of assets that 
simultaneously generate revenue and develop new technologies.  
Given that one company cannot develop all the expertise and capacity themselves, 
strategic alliances or ‘networks of innovation’ are being used (Bakkers, Duysters & Verspagen 
2002).  Knowledge ‘spillovers’ - between companies and with universities - are fuelling these 
networks (Colyvas et al., 2002).  Technologies that lack an initial value path within an 
organization can find an external fit where it fulfills the demand of different industries.  The re-
emergence of the vaccine industry can be attributed to a combination of new technological 
developments and a build-up of networks utilizing new knowledge to full potential.  This chapter 
will examine some of the sustaining, incremental, and disruptive innovations taking place in the 
vaccine industry. 
In the following sections, we will examine innovation taking place in the vaccine 
industry. Some of these are incremental innovations while others are disruptive innovations. For 
example, research-grade recombinant DNA techniques are now being used to create a 
completely new class of vaccines.                      
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3.1 Multivalent Vaccines: Old Vaccines, New Combinations 
Whether in the developing or developed world, the increasing number of vaccines 
recommended for children places challenges on the vaccination system.  There is a risk of 
patient fatigue as families make multiple visits to a medical facility for immunization.  The risk of 
an associated adverse event also increases, whether temporal or causal in nature.  In remote 
communities, those who wish to be vaccinated may not be able to visit a clinic on the day that a 
trained medical worker is available to perform the vaccination.  A solution to these issues is to 
vaccinate against multiple pathogens in a single dose. There are number of companies that have 
successfully created such multivalent vaccines.  In 2006, both GSK and Crucell received 
prequalification from the WHO for pentavalent vaccines of the following formulation: 
diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (whole cell), Hib and Hep B.   UNICEF alone purchases an 
estimated 400 million pentavalent doses annually.  In 2008, Shantha and Panacea accessed the 
UN market by receiving prequalification status.  Serum Institute of India (SII) has received 
prequalification status in 2010, indicating that this innovation continues to be financially 
beneficial for companies that adopt it. 
In the developed world, new multivalent vaccines have also seen great success. These 
incremental innovations have extended the product life cycle of older vaccines, enabling 
companies to generate additional revenues. In 2008, sales of Sanofi’s Pentacel increased 21% 
over the previous year and gained 50% of market share within a few months.  Pentacel is a 
pentavalent vaccine with antigens from five disease agents; diphtheria, acellular pertussis, 
tetanus, inactivated poliovirus and Hib.  The use of this combination vaccine reduced by seven 
the number of injections recommended for children aged 0-2 years of age in the US vaccination 
schedule (Sanofi-Aventis, 2009).  The “crowded schedule” of childhood vaccines in the western 
world is an impediment to the successful uptake of new vaccines (Graham, Legerwood & Nabel, 
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2009).  Reducing vaccination visits appears to have been a major factor in the rapid adoption of 
Pentacel in the US market. 
3.2 Formulation 
Older vaccines used killed whole cell or attenuated pathogen to induce an immune 
response. Though these vaccines normally induce a strong immune response, they have a risk of 
causing the disease that they should prevent.  Vaccines in their ideal formulation would catalyze 
a long-term protective response in a single dose, while having no associated risk of adverse 
effects. There are several pathogens for which vaccine development has not yet been 
successful. These diseases include malaria, HIV, dengue and tuberculosis, which together affect 
hundreds of millions of people worldwide.  New formulation technologies hold promise for 
fulfilling this unmet need.  
3.2.1 Reverse Genetics   
With reverse genetics technology, genes that code for proteins are isolated from the 
pathogen. These genes are inserted into a small circle of DNA known as a plasmid. Once the 
plasmids are introduced into a mammalian cell, viral proteins are made and assembled into 
“virus like” particles (Neumann, Hatta & Kawaoka, 2003). These viruses are not able to replicate 
and, hence non-pathogenic. This method of vaccine production eliminates the chance of 
vaccine-induced disease.   
Some pathogens are difficult to grow under culture conditions. Other viruses such as 
HIV pose a significant safety risk by regaining virulence during culture. Reverse genetics can be 
effectively used to develop vaccines for these difficult pathogens. Add-on technologies that can 
increase the efficiency of introducing plasmids into cells will simplify and shorten the 
manufacturing process.  With the use of correct combination of surface and internal proteins 
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from different pathogenic species, a multivalent vaccine can be developed. Novartis’s meningitis 
B candidate that is currently in phase III trials was formulated with this technology.  
3.2.2 DNA Vaccines 
DNA vaccines are the most recent vaccine formulation technology.  Genetically 
engineered gene sequences of pathogens are used instead of pathogenic proteins or the whole 
organism.  Antigen-presenting cells of the vaccinated individual take up the foreign DNA and 
produce the associated protein. The immune system detects the proteins as foreign, resulting in 
an immune response.  Recently, researchers demonstrated that a single dose of HIV DNA 
vaccine induced a lasting immune response in non-human primates (Arrode-Brusés et al., 2010). 
This study will provide insight in designing future vaccines against HIV.  
DNA vaccines have a number of advantages. Unlike attenuated or killed pathogen 
vaccines, there is no risk of infection. Antigen-presenting cells that incorporate the pathogen 
genes will provide a long-term antigen source that could eliminate the need for booster doses. 
Since these vaccines strongly stimulate the immune system, potentially toxic adjuvants are not 
needed. As discussed further in the manufacturing section, recombinant DNA is relatively easy 
and inexpensive to produce. The quality control burden will be reduced, as there is no need for 
conjugation or other secondary manufacturing steps. DNA is stable at room temperatures for 
longer periods, reducing the need for refrigeration during transport and storage. This last point 
is particularly valuable for developing country vaccine supply, since in infrastructure-limited 
environments, cold-chain control is not readily available.  
DNA vaccine technology has many of the characteristics of a disruptive innovation 
(Christensen, Baumann, Ruggles & Sadtler, 2006). Unlike existing vaccine formulations, DNA 
vaccines are much simpler and less costly. Genes from different pathogens can be transferred 
using the same plasmid system to induce an immune response, so the technology can be used 
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for many diseases.  If successful, this technology will replace some of the current, complex 
vaccines as well as address future demand for new vaccines.  
DNA vaccines are becoming attractive to investors and entrepreneurs because of the 
numerous differentiators. With further technology improvements and proof of efficacy in 
human trials, this industry segment is likely to expand dramatically.  Biotechnology companies 
currently dominate the DNA vaccine field. There are a large number of small firms competing 
with proprietary technologies. Inovio Pharmaceuticals Inc. is a Pennsylvania-based company 
developing both DNA-vaccines and safe DNA transfer technologies. Their current vaccine 
pipeline includes one completed phase I study, six phase I studies in progress and three 
preclinical studies. In 2004, Merck & Co. licensed Inovio’s proprietary DNA transfer technology 
along with DNA-vaccine candidates to a variety of cancers. The deal included upfront and 
milestone payments, development fees, royalties, and a supply agreement. Inovio’s other 
partnerships include a collaboration with ChronTech Pharma of Sweden. ChronTech’s 
therapeutic vaccine against chronic hepatitis C infection will shortly be starting phase I with 
Inovio’s DNA transfer technology (ChronTech, 2010a). Inovio’s DNA vaccine development 
platform is also under assessment by the PATH Malaria Vaccine Initiative (ChronTech, 2010b). 
Vical Inc. of San Diego, CA is another company that has been successful in developing DNA 
vaccine technologies. Vical’s CMV vaccine TransVax had shown promising results in their initial 
analysis of phase II trial results. The company is set to release final data in the third quarter of 
2010 (Vical, 2010).        
3.3 Thermostability 
The majority of vaccines are refrigerated to ensure stability.  Transport and storage of 
vaccines in this ‘cold-chain’ adds an estimated 14% to the cost of vaccines (IRIN, 2010).  Old 
  
49 
fridges can cause accidental freezing, which destroys any vaccine containing alum adjuvant. The 
US CDC estimates that $20 M per year in vaccines is wasted due to improper refrigeration in 
their Vaccines for Children program alone (Welte, 2007).  In low-income countries, the limited 
cold-chain is under greater strain due to the increasing number of vaccines provided in single 
dose, bulky formats; vaccine wastage rates are as high as 10% for single dose vials (Parmar et al., 
2010). 
Demand for improved thermostability has come from countries of all incomes.  
Cambridge Biostability had been developing two different stabilization technologies.  Sugar 
glassification was under development by the company and competitors.  This technology is 
based on observations of a drought resistant ‘Resurrection Plant’.  To protect against drought, 
the resurrection plant produces a thermostable form of sugar.  Upon re-encountering water, the 
plant recovers almost immediately.  Viruses dried in sugar glass also retained their functionality 
upon reconstitution.  However, there were serious concerns raised about environmental impact 
of the formulation process (Quested, 2009).   
In December of 2006, the company announced the formation of a joint venture with 
Panacea of India.  Panacea purchased a 10% share in the company for £1.9 M.  The focus of the 
JV was on the creation of multivalent thermostable liquid formulations (Panacea, 2006). This is 
the first known example of an investment by an Indian firm in a developed world company 
technology.  While Cambridge Biostability recently declared insolvency, this JV demonstrates the 
increasing buying power and strategic initiative of the Indian vaccine manufacturing industry. 
(Quested, 2009).   
In 2003, Medimmune gained FDA approval for their influenza vaccine, Flumist.  Despite 
the innovative nasal delivery method, Medimmune did not achieve significant market uptake at 
launch.  The vaccine required storage at negative 20C.  This temperature requires special freezer 
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storage, a unique requirement amongst influenza vaccines.  Medimmune soon reformulated the 
vaccine to be thermostable at 4C; in 2007, the FDA approved this vaccine format (FDA, 2007).  
This case is clearly illustrative of the power of market forces to drive innovation.  If a financial 
analysis showed a compelling benefit for vaccines stable at room temperatures, the industry 
would rapidly move to innovate.  Emerging country manufacturers may provide pressure for 
broader adoption of thermostable vaccines by creating a thermostable influenza vaccine, where 
there is a competitive market in the developed world.   
3.4 Manufacturing 
The current method for production of many virus-based vaccines is by culture in 
fertilized chicken eggs.  Although this manufacturing technology has evolved over 60 years of 
sustained-incremental gain of knowledge and experience, the unpredictable nature of egg 
incubation and viral culture continues to constrain production levels. This was evident in the 
2009 H1N1 response when manufacturers produced only 32 million of a planned 161 million 
doses by the onset of the flu season (Burns, 2009). This pandemic and concerns about the 
potential of the H5N1 virus to evolve to a pandemic strain have reawakened interest in 
alternate production methods. Mammalian cell, plant and bacterial antigen expression systems 
are under development, often with significant support from wealthy countries concerned about 
national health security (Faster Vaccines, 2009).  The US Health Biomedical Advanced Research 
and Development Authority (BARDA) has awarded US $1.3 B for manufacturer development 
plants over the last 5 years (Wechsler, 2010). The goal of this government investment is to help 
ensure reliable vaccine supply through development and integration of new vaccine 
manufacturing technologies. Without external subsidy, it may be prohibitive for a company to 
make the significant capital investment required for new manufacturing technologies. 
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3.4.1 Mammalian Cell Culture  
Mammalian cell-culture vaccine technology produces viruses, “virus like particles” or 
combinations of pathogen derived proteins in a controlled cell culture system. After production, 
vaccine components are isolated from the culture media or by lysing the cells. In case of 
influenza, cells are inoculated with the three strains of influenza viruses identified by the WHO 
as most likely to be circulating in that season. Mammalian cells used for viral culture can be 
stored frozen and can be rapidly recovered. Hence, the response rate during an outbreak is 
faster and production is scalable based on the need. Since vaccines are produced in regulated 
machinery, the quality is monitored and maintained to the highest standards. Use of cell culture 
methods to produce protein and viruses is not a new technology as it has been widely applied in 
basic life science research. However, it is a newly adopted technology for the vaccine 
manufacturing industry.    
Novartis‘s influenza vaccine Optaflu was the first cell-based influenza vaccine to reach 
the European market. In 2009, Novartis received a US $490 M grant from US Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) to build a cell-culture vaccine plant in Holly Springs, North 
Carolina. This plant is the first large scale cell culture-based vaccine manufacturing facility in the 
US. Other companies such as Baxter and Protein Science Corporation are also developing 
mammalian cell culture vaccines (BioPharm, 2010). As the industry develops new knowledge of 
how to build efficient cell culture-based manufacturing technologies, facilities and production 
costs will decrease. This will allow new entrants. The initial production cost may be higher due 
to capital investment, but over time, efficiency gains will reduce costs and create a higher return 
on investment.      
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3.4.2 DNA Vaccine Manufacturing 
Upgrading research-grade plasmid production technologies allows the manufacture of 
plasmids to use as DNA vaccines. Plasmids are circles of DNA.  For vaccine manufacturing, they 
contain genes from the pathogen, which is transferred into bacterial cells. These bacteria are 
then cultured within bioreactors to produce large volumes of plasmid.  Lastly, the pathogen’s 
genes along with the plasmid DNA are harvested.  
DNA vaccine bioreactors can be assembled with ‘off the shelf’ components as the 
machinery is widely used. Clean room facilities are added for clinical use to prevent 
contamination. Once a sufficient quantity is produced, plasmids are biochemically purified from 
the bacterial culture for vaccine formulation. In comparison to traditional vaccines, much 
smaller doses of DNA vaccines are needed. A DNA manufacturing plant can have many small 
bioreactors operating independently.  Individual bioreactors can be shut down or brought online 
as demand warrants.  The capital investment cost for a DNA manufacturing facility is 
significantly less than a traditional egg-vaccine production facility. This allows smaller 
biotechnology companies an opportunity to establish their own production facilities.  For 
example, Inovio has a 500L cGMP manufacturing plant in Texas and a 3000L plasmid 
manufacturing facility in Korea (Inovio, 2008). 
3.4.3 Plant Organism Manufacturing 
Plant-based vaccine manufacturing is carried out in two different ways. In the whole 
plant method, transgenic field crops express the pathogen proteins. One of the major 
drawbacks of this method is that it is difficult to regulate the environmental conditions.  The 
transgenic protein is expressed in all parts of the plant while the plant interacts with its 
surrounding environment. There is not an established regulatory path for determining the safety 
of proteins isolated from these plants.  
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The second method involves plant cell culture  manufacturing. This process uses salt, 
sugar and water to culture plant cells in a highly regulated environment. A single cell is 
transformed with the pathogen gene of interest and this cell multiplies to transform into a 
protein production apparatus. Cells can only grow in the contained environment, eliminating 
external environmental factors. In 2006, Dow Agrosciences received FDA approval for the 
world’s first plant-based vaccine for use in animals (In-Pharma-Technologist, 2006). In February 
of this year, a consortium was formed to demonstrate proof of concept for plant-generated 
human vaccines (Texas A&M, 2010).  The US Defence Advanced Research Project Agency 
primarily funds this project, suggesting the organization recognizes the potential of plant-
generated vaccine technology.  
3.4.4 Disposable and Modular Manufacturing Components 
A time-intensive step in conjugate vaccine production is fractionation of polysaccharides 
for attachment -conjugation- to proteins. Conjugate vaccines include the sales blockbuster, 
Prevnar.  This fractionation process has traditionally used beaded resin columns made on site, 
which is difficult and time-consuming. The introduction of disposable materials has an important 
role in increasing efficiency, speed, quality and safety during vaccine manufacturing. Disposable, 
pre-packed membrane columns eliminate the need for custom column packing. A pre-pack 
column such as Pall's Mustang ion exchange membrane can remove contaminants 100 times 
faster than conventional resin columns (Pall 2010). Disposable materials reduce time lost to 
error and allow switching processes in a timely manner. Cleaning and decontamination 
processes are reduced, which simplifies adherence to regulatory requirements. Given that 
quality and safety control issues comprise 70% of production time, these disposable 
technologies can make a significant impact on manufacturing speed.  
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Smaller autonomous robotic systems for manufacturing and fill/finish of vaccines can 
also help with efficiencies in manufacturing. According to Christopher Procyshyn, CEO of Vanrx 
PharmaSystems in Vancouver, demand is increasing for automated filling technologies. Fill and 
finish expertise is limited to a relatively small number of specialists.  This constitutes a significant 
barrier to entry.  The majority of vaccine shortages have been caused by contamination during 
manufacturing or fill/finish steps. Automated technologies remove the human factors that may 
lead to contamination. Unpredictability of vaccine demand is a major problem for large 
manufacturing plants. However, these smaller modular manufacturing and fill/finish units can 
be brought into use based on demand; they also allow redundancy for uninterrupted production 
in the case that one unit fails. Dr. Procyshyn sees the greatest demand for robotic systems from 
smaller biotechnology companies that have the need for smaller, cheaper manufacturing 
capacity. He envisions future technology transfer as “vaccine in a box”, where vaccine 
manufacturing and fill/finish machinery is packaged together for local manufacturers in 
developing countries. 
3.4.5 Manufacturing Summary 
The vaccine manufacturing industry must follow the significant safely requirements set 
forth by regulatory agencies, and so there is caution about the adoption of new manufacturing 
infrastructure.  Even GMP approved technologies have taken decades to gain industry-wide 
adoption, as manufacturers have typically invested significant capital in older manufacturing 
processes. Though the adoption of new technologies increases manufacturing costs in the short 
term, efficiency and consistency savings accrue over time.  High-income countries, especially the 
US, have also demonstrated a willingness to support expensive manufacturing facility 
construction.  This has encouraged some MVCs to build new technology manufacturing plants.   
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3.5 Delivery Technologies 
In 1885, Louis Pasteur used a hypodermic syringe to vaccinate against rabies; this 
remains the most common vaccine delivery system today (NMAH, 2010).  One of the major 
problems with needle-based vaccine delivery is patients’ fear of needles. This fear has been 
estimated to affect 10 % or more of the US population and plays a role in the negative publicity 
that vaccines receive (Hamilton, 1995).  Additionally, some studies have shown that over 85% of 
healthcare workers experience an accidental needle stick per year, placing them at risk for 
exposure to hepatitis and HIV (Lee, Bottman, Xanthakos and Nicklasson, 2005). In the 
developing world, needles are often reused with insufficient disinfection.  40% of Hep B and C 
infections and 5% of HIV infections are attributable to improper needle reuse (Nundy, 2010).  
Unsafe disposal of needles has also created a public health hazard for people (often children) 
who scavenge landfills for their livelihood.  This additional disease burden places a strain on 
fragile health care systems.  
Though trained healthcare workers are necessary for proper use of syringes, the 
devices’ low cost has meant that they have remained the dominant delivery method. Needle 
and syringe manufacturing is strongly embedded within the vaccine industry, limiting the 
adoption of other devices. As a result, new devices are only beginning to be available.  Sanofi 
gained EU marketing approval for an influenza vaccine with delivery by microneedle technology 
in early 2009. This device methodology provides a differentiator for a vaccine that has significant 
market competition. Similarly, the product life cycle of commoditized vaccine can be lengthened 
through incorporating a new delivery device.  
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3.5.1 Edible Vaccines 
In the past decade, scientists have examined delivering vaccines through edible plants. 
Plant cells produce pathogen proteins through a vector-based method similar to that used in 
DNA vaccines. This method has been successful in developing plants that are resistant to pests 
and pesticides. Researchers have also developed plants that produce immunogens.  Rice, corn, 
potatoes and tomatoes have been used to produce vaccines.  
There are a number of major advantages to an edible plant base vaccine; it is a safer 
method of administration than by needle, cold chain requirements are eliminated, and plants 
can be easily reproduced in large quantities using low-cost manufacturing mechanisms. In 
addition to providing healthcare savings, plant-based vaccine manufacturing could stimulate 
agriculture-based economies in the developing world.   
The world’s first clinical trial for edible vaccines was conducted in 1997. In this trial, 19 
out of 20 people who ate potatoes containing E. coli antigens developed a protective antibody 
responses, with no adverse reactions reported (Tacket et al., 1998). Hepatitis B surface antigen 
(Mason, Lam & Arntzen, 1992), heat-labile enterotoxin B subunit (Tacket et al., 2004), and 
Norwalk virus particles (Zhang et al., 2006) have all been produced in plants. These vaccines are 
still in development stage. 
There are a number of technical challenges for plant-based vaccines. Since processing or 
cooking plant material can destroy the antigens, it is important to select plants that are edible 
when raw.  Therefore, there is a need for alternatives to vaccine production in rice and 
potatoes. Determining the actual vaccine dose will be difficult as the protein expression level 
can be variable. Lastly, but most importantly, this delivery method will be challenging for infant 
vaccines.    As typical immunization schedules have six vaccinations in the first 2 months of life, 
this is a significant limitation (CDC, 2010b). 
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3.5.2 Intranasal Delivery  
The majority of pathogens enter the body through the upper respiratory tract and the 
mouth. It is therefore plausible that stimulating these mucosal membranes to create 
immunological memory may be the best way to prevent disease. Vaccination via nasal mucosa 
rapidly induces strong systemic and local mucosal immunity. The large number of fine blood 
vessels in the nasal mucosal membrane facilitate rapid uptake of the vaccine. Direct 
introduction to the blood is also more effective than oral delivery as the liver does not process 
the vaccine.   
One intranasal delivery vaccine reached the market in 2003.  MedImmune developed 
FluMist, the first nasal spray vaccine approved by FDA. The vaccine is directly delivered to the 
nasal mucosa in the form of a mist. However, in 2008, revenues were only US $104 M.   This is 
due to several limitations.  Flumist must be stored at negative 20°C, while traditional flu 
vaccines are stored at 4°C, so that cold-chain and storage requirements are greater.  The cost of 
a dose is four times greater than a traditional flu vaccine. The FDA only permitted a restricted 
age group, 5-49 years old, to receive the vaccine.   
Today there are a number of biotechnology companies developing nasal vaccine 
delivery technologies. NanoBio Corporation of Michigan has developed a ‘nanoemulsion’-based 
vaccine delivery system. This platform supports intranasal vaccines to gain a robust immune 
responses in animals vaccinated against influenza, pneumococcal, Hep B, HIV, RSV, anthrax, and 
smallpox. Successes of the technology in animals indicate further development in to human 
trials (NanoBio, 2010).  
As cold-chain storage is increasingly strained, companies are focusing on creating heat-
stable nasal delivery technologies. A lyophilized or spray-dried intranasal vaccine powder would 
allow room temperature storage. A complete delivery solution would be created if the vaccine 
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were reconstituted immediately prior to injection within the delivery device. This capability 
would eliminate the current use of sterile vials for mixing.  It would also reduce the risk of using 
the wrong diluents and vaccine contamination during devices filling. The VRx2™ delivery 
platform of Mystic Pharmaceuticals contains these auto-reconstitution capabilities. Sterile 
blisters containing freeze-dried vaccine and the sterile diluent solution are stored in separate 
reservoirs. At the point of use, the vaccine powder is mixed with the diluent to in situ 
reconstitute within the delivery system, followed by intranasal delivery (Mystic 2010). There are 
a number of factors that determine the success of intranasal vaccine delivery technologies, 
listed below. Though the device is designed to deliver exact dose every time, there is no 
guarantee that the right dose will be absorbed to the blood stream. Furthermore, penetration 
through the mucosal membranes will require live vaccines or killed vaccines with adjuvants, 
which can pose a risk of infection. There is also a slight risk of vaccine contact with the nervous 
system causing other unknown side effects. Lastly, nasal administration of an effective dose in 
infants may not be possible.       
3.5.3 Vaccine Patches 
Vaccine patch technologies use the strong immune surveillance system of the skin to 
stimulate the immune response.  With controlled release of antigen through the patch, a 
constant dose can be administered over an extended time, mimicking a booster effect.  The 
advantages of vaccine patches include their ease of use, potential temperature stability, and 
small volume.  These last two features could dramatically reduce transport and storage costs for 
vaccines.   
Vaccine patches in development are being marketed to travellers and developing world 
markets. In 2008, Iomia Corporation reported a successful phase I trial against severe diarrhoea 
for the travellers’ market (Bloomberg, 2008). In 2009, the Austrian vaccine manufacturer 
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Intercell acquired Iomia.  They have continued development and are currently conducting phase 
III trials (Intercell, 2010b).  Intercell is further developing the trans-dermal patch to enable the 
delivery of antigens for other indications, including influenza. The development program for 
pandemic flu vaccine patches is funded in part by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. In 2009, Intercell formed a strategic alliance with GSK to further develop and 
commercialize the technology. 
3.5.4 Prefilled Needle Delivery Devices 
In current practice, most vaccines are produced and packaged into single or multi-dose 
vials. The vaccine is administered by filling a syringe and then injecting the dose by needle. 
While standard syringe and needle pairs cost only a few cents, they have significant drawbacks.  
Specially trained healthcare workers must understand the appropriate storage conditions, 
diluent and dose for each vaccine. In remote areas, medical staff may not be available, 
preventing vaccine use for residents of small communities and travellers.   In the developing 
world, resources to train healthcare worker has always been limited.   
One drawback associated with multi-dose vials is that the vaccine typically must be used 
the day it is reconstituted.  If only multi-dose vials are available when a vaccination is requested, 
the remaining supply is wasted if not used. This has led to multi-dose vaccine wastage rates as 
high as 80% (Guichard, 2010).  One solution to these problems is to use pre-filled single dose 
syringes.  
Several companies have developed needle-based devices that can be used safely 
without significant medical training. PATH’s Uniject is an example of such a device, which is 
distributed worldwide by the licence holder Becton Dickinson and Company (BD). With this 
device, pressing the pre-filled blister releases the contents through an attached needle. This 
single-use device is non-refillable to prevent re-use. The Indonesian company PT Bio Farma has 
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built a fill and finish line specifically for Uniject.  Since 2001, the company fills their Hep B 
vaccine into the devices for the Indonesian Ministry of Health (Nelson, Widjaya & Wittet, 2002).  
The vaccine is administered at birth in the case of home deliveries, where a medical worker with 
extensive knowledge of needle use might not be present.  This device has removed the 
requirement for trained healthcare workers and made the vaccination process simple, which is a 
major advantage in increasing access to vaccines in developing countries.  Shantha Biotechnics 
introduced their Hep B vaccine, Shanvac-B in a Uniject device in 2005; as a major Indian 
manufacturer, this has allowed the birth-dose strategy to be used in India as well (Bioportfolio, 
2005).    
Prefilled reconstitution devices contain a dry powder and liquid in separate blisters that 
are reconstituted by pressing on the liquid. The single dose of vaccine is delivered though an 
integrated needle. AktiVax and Aktiv-Dry are two technology companies combining their 
capabilities to develop the Immunoject delivery device (AktiVax, 2010). Aktiv-Dry has developed 
the technology to convert vaccines into dry powder (Dubin, 2010). The device is similar in shape 
to a small credit card. The needle is disabled after a single dose usage by folding the card in on 
itself.  Graphic instructions for use of the device are printed on the card for additional ease of 
use. One of the major advantages of this technology over liquid prefilled devices should be the 
removal of vaccines from the cold-chain.  This product has not been tested in clinical trials. 
Uniject was licensed to the syringe manufacturer BD in 1995 (PATH, 2005). However, 
market acceptance has been relatively slow. All the MVCs have invested hundreds of millions of 
dollars in capital equipment for their proprietary filling lines. While fulfilling new technology 
requests from high-income country markets might be financially beneficial, demand for Uniject 
comes from markets that typically purchase vaccines at lower profit margins.  However, there 
has been adoption of Uniject by Pfizer for Depo-Provera, a contraceptive drug that is 
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administered repeatedly, so that capital costs may be amortized more quickly (PATH, 2009b).  If 
the company gains regulatory approval for the new formulation with the device, Pfizer may 
expand the use of Uniject to other products including vaccines.  
3.5.5 Intradermal Administration  
In 2009, the first intradermally delivered influenza vaccine was approved for use in a 
major market.  The intradermal method of delivery deposits the vaccine in the dermal layer of 
skin.  The high number of immune cells in this layer means that the immune response is strong 
so that the dose required is less.  Sanofi has targeted Intanza to individuals over 60 years of age.  
Due to aging of the immune system, these individuals do not always generate a sufficient 
response to influenza vaccines delivered by needle and syringe.  Sanofi had sales of over €1 B in 
influenza vaccines in 2009; with Intanza, they have the opportunity to gain another market 
segment through differentiation.  Intanza will also be a delivery option for those with phobia of 
needles, as the delivery device is 1.5mm in length, 1/10 the length of traditional syringes (BD 
Worldwide, 2009). 
Governments are also interested in delivery of vaccines by intradermal administration 
due to their ability to lower the dose required.  An effective immune response can be generated 
with as little as 20% of the dose needed for conventional subcutaneous injection.  This would be 
immensely helpful in the case of a vaccine shortage.  Biojector 2000, by Bioject Medical 
Technologies Inc., was chosen by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for influenza 
clinical trials just completed (Businesswire, 2010). The results of this study are still pending. If 
successful, this innovative technology will provide reduced costs per dose to the purchaser.     
  
62 
3.6 The Strategic Importance of Innovation 
The vaccine industry has undergone remarkable growth in the past decade.  
Investments in R&D for new vaccines have increased primarily because of the profits gained 
through wealthy governments’ purchase of expensive vaccines in the early 2000s.  
Wealthy government concerns over vaccine shortages have meant that they have also 
provided extensive financial support for manufacturing innovations.  As described in the section 
on manufacturing, small and large vaccine manufacturing companies alike have accessed these 
funds, reducing initial capital costs.  As infrastructure can comprise as much as 60% of the total 
price of vaccine production, the opportunity to reduce these expenses has a significant 
economic benefit (Danzon, Pereira & Tejwani, 2005).  
Adoption of new modular vaccine manufacturing and fill/finish technologies is allowing 
small companies to afford manufacturing in their own value chain, enabling vertical integration 
by smaller firms. Replacing old egg-based technology with cell culture manufacture will increase 
efficiency while reducing cost. Innovations in manufacturing processes and equipment improve 
vaccine production security. 
The majority of innovation in the industry has been for influenza vaccines, where the 
highest competition for market share exists.  There are multiple influenza vaccine producers, 
and so product differentiation plays a key part in maximizing profits. The recent H1N1 
pandemic, flu vaccine shortages and buyers in the developed world who are willing to pay for a 
device that meets their unique needs, are all factors driving companies to innovate for flu 
vaccines. The device used in the recently approved Intanza provides a dose sparing benefit that 
would be of use for many other market segments. Adoption of successful innovations from 
influenza vaccines into other products will further strengthen vaccine access, safety, and supply. 
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MVCs are starting to incorporate these delivery devices to differentiate their older 
vaccines from competition. This strategy is likely to generate higher net profit margins through 
higher pricing power created by perceived uniqueness of the vaccine. In an industry where the 
majority of the end users are not the buyers, governments’ and supranational organizations’ 
willingness to pay for differentiated vaccine products such as pentavalent formulations will be 
robust if the social benefit of increased vaccine coverage (defined as the percentage of the 
population who have been vaccinated) is clear.  
The diversity of vaccine related innovations had gone beyond the capabilities of any 
individual company, forcing collaboration to reduce the uncertainties associated with innovation 
development.  As a result, the vaccine industry has “positive sum” competition that translates 
successful innovations in one vaccine to others, meeting the needs of different groups of 
customers. Multivalent vaccines designed to address different regional needs exemplify this 
trend.  As emerging country and other smaller vaccine companies produce competitor vaccines 
for other indications than influenza, they will innovate to differentiate their process costs or 
product features. Any innovation that results in a differentiation for the vaccine producer and 
benefits vaccine supply stability will be rapidly adopted by the industry. 
Innovations in vaccines are reviving the once stagnant, commoditized industry and 
adding value to vaccine products. The advances in development, manufacturing, and delivery 
technologies that we discussed here are helping to increase efficiency in gaining access to 
disease preventing vaccines. As the newer technology becomes mature, the cost of 
development and manufacturing will decrease. DNA vaccine manufacture will likely not have 
high adoption costs, giving this class of vaccines the potential to be a disruptive technology.   
Reduced cost and increased production is necessary to address future vaccine demands.         
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4: DEMAND FOR VACCINES 
The demand for vaccines changes based on demographic factors, and disease 
prevalence in the country region. In this chapter, we will analyze drivers behind high-, middle- 
and low-income country demand for vaccines. We will further examine demand-forecasting 
strategies that will help vaccine access to middle- and low-income countries.  
4.1 Introduction 
  In 2009, the global vaccine industry reported US $27 B in revenue (Pr-inside, 2010). This 
was a 50% increase over 2007, during which there was $18.5 B in revenue; the exceptional 
revenue yield was in part due to increased influenza vaccine sales in the year of the H1N1 
pandemic (Maggon, 2009). Predicted growth continues to be robust, with a calculated 
compound annual rate of 11.5% during 2008-2016, reaching total annual revenues of $52 B in 
2016 (Taylor, 2010). Currently, the five MVCs control 85% of total market share (Figure 4); 
Sanofi, Merck and GSK alone held 74.5% of the market. By 2012, vaccine revenues are expected 
to represent 10% of total pharmaceutical sales. The rapid market uptake of high-cost vaccines in 
the developed world has driven this trend. As the MVCs lose further margins on basic 
paediatrics vaccines, they will look to increase profits with new vaccines in niche markets. 
  
Figure 4: Vaccine Market Share in 2008
 
Source: 2009 Annual Reports, Sanofi
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demand volumes at each income level differ widely. In addition, variability in immunization 
coverage rates, introduction rate of new vaccines, and predictability of demand forecasting 
further complicate the global market for vaccines. 
 In this chapter, we will discuss the differences in calculating demand for countries with 
different economic capacity. We will then discuss the specific vaccine markets of representative 
countries from each income level, looking at countries that in total comprise over half of the 
world’s population. 
4.2 High-Income Markets 
In high-income countries such as the US, Japan, and Canada, vaccines costing several 
hundred dollars per course are usually accepted by government purchasers for the paediatric 
market. There is an ability and willingness to pay for vaccines. However, population growth also 
has a direct impact on vaccine industry profitability. With a declining fertility rate in the 
developed world, the demand for paediatric vaccines is also decreasing. Japan will decline from 
the current population of 127 million to 100 million by 2050 (Indexmundi, 2010). Therefore, the 
vaccine industry will have to generate revenues in the high-income markets through new 
vaccines for other market niches. They will create demand for these expensive vaccines through 
innovation, marketing strategies, and lobbying to public health officials.   
The demand for influenza vaccines has been steadily increasing for the past few years. 
Concerns about H5N1 bird flu and the H1N1 pandemic have contributed to increased knowledge 
about influenza in the developed countries. There are now surveillance systems that can 
accurately predict the demand for flu vaccines. Annually, 50,000 people die from seasonal 
influenza and over 200,000 people need hospitalization (Cohen and McKee, 2010). An epidemic 
can cause up to $1 B in healthcare costs. These effects could be mitigated by vaccinating the 
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majority of the population. However, the US only achieved a 20% vaccination rate amongst 18-
49 year olds in 2008. This is the highest rate recorded in the previous 20 years (National Health 
Interview Survey, 2009). This relatively low uptake is likely because influenza vaccines are one of 
the few vaccines that are not typically paid for by the government. However, during the 2009 
influenza pandemic scare, the US purchased 240 million doses of H1N1 vaccine (Market 
Research Media, 2009). As concerns of the impact of a pandemic grow, even countries with 
predominantly private medical systems will likely purchase influenza vaccines to protect their 
populations. This is one of the segments where the high-income markets will have growth in the 
future. As a result, MVCs are competing through product differentiation with influenza vaccines. 
The vaccine market for international travelers from high-income countries will also 
expand in the coming years. Dengue, malaria, typhoid and Japanese encephalitis vaccines will 
have a market for both travelers and developing countries. The RTS,S vaccine candidate is 
forecast to have a market of US $419 M by 2025 (Businesswire, 2009). Almost all of this value 
will come from high-margin sales to travelers and the military, as GSK has agreed to sell the 
vaccine slightly above cost of goods in the developing world. 
4.2.1 United States 
The US is the largest vaccine market in the world. This is due to a) fast uptake of high-
price vaccines by the government, b) a relatively large population of 304 million people in 2008, 
and c) some of the highest prices in the world for vaccines due to the predominantly private 
medical system. The CDC vaccine price is often half that paid by private buyers in the US (CDC, 
2010c). In 2009, the US accounted for more than 50% of combined vaccines sales of Merck, GSK, 
Pfizer and Novartis, a trend that is likely to continue (Merck, 2010a; GSK 2010d; Pfizer, 2010a; 
Novartis 2010d). The US government has made vaccination a public health priority. In 1977, the 
American Academy of Paediatrics (AAP) called for a universal childhood immunization program 
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that would be comprehensive and conducted in a timely manner (Paediatrics, 2010). The 
success of this policy is evident from the 90% or better coverage rates of vaccines to diphtheria, 
pertussis, tetanus, Hep B, measles, Hib and polio (Childinfo, 2010). In the US, financing vaccines 
is a joint responsibility between the private and public sector. Childhood vaccines are typically 
purchased through the federal government’s Vaccines for Children (VFC) program, which has an 
annual US $2 B budget (Welte, 2007). Vaccines for children bought privately are reimbursed 
through third-party payers. However, the public healthcare system has a minimal role in 
purchasing adult vaccines. Adult vaccines are largely purchased privately.   
4.2.2 Japan 
Japan had 127 million residents in 2008.  The Japanese vaccination schedule covers 
fewer paediatric vaccines than in the US and Europe. Hepatitis A & B, influenza, varicella, and 
mumps are still voluntary vaccines. Even during the recent influenza pandemic, the Japanese 
paid for the vaccines out-of-pocket (Doshi & Akabayashi, 2010). As the country’s vaccination 
program develops, other vaccines are expected to be included in the national program. The 
current annual vaccine market in Japan is US $600 M (Vaczine-analytics, 2009). Because of this, 
Novartis, GSK and Merck are setting up collaborations and facilities in Japan.  
4.3 Middle- and Low-Income Country Markets 
As the populations of the US and Japan age and birthrates continue to decrease, sales of 
paediatric doses stagnate in high-income countries. For this reason, vaccine manufacturers are 
looking to low- and middle-income countries for future revenues. As all these nations gain 
economic strength, their demand for vaccines also grows.    
 Middle-income countries are classified by the World Bank as those with GNI per capita 
above US $950. Though Brazil, China, and India are considered middle-income, their economic 
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differences are great. Indian’s GNI per capita was 1/7th that of Brazil in 2008 and much more 
similar to Bangladesh, which is classified as low-income (World Bank, 2010a). The markets for 
vaccine are similarly disparate, in both the access to newer vaccines and who pays for those 
products. We will discuss the market for vaccines in the most populated countries of each 
income level: Brazil, for the upper-middle income, China and India for lower-middle income, and 
Bangladesh for low-income. 
4.3.1 Brazil 
 Brazil had a population of 191 million and an estimated annual birthrate of 3.1 million 
infants in 2008 (World Bank, 2010c). The public health system pays for most vaccines. The 
national budget for vaccine purchases in 2008 was an estimated US $550 M (Homma, 2009). 
Additionally, the government has rapidly adopted additional vaccines to the public vaccination 
schedule. In 2006, Brazil became the first nation in the world to introduce rotavirus vaccines 
into the public health program (Wecker, 2006). A second-generation pneumococcal vaccine was 
introduced to the country in 2010. Both of these early adoptions were part of technology 
transfer agreements between GSK and the government-controlled vaccine manufacturers in the 
country. The government generally does not pay for vaccines unless they are manufactured 
within the country. National manufacturers supply 83% of vaccines for the Brazil’s public health 
system. Brazil is an emerging economy with a growing middle class able to purchase newly 
developed vaccines on the private market. However, there are few vaccines that are not part of 
the public health system, so profits from private sales are likely small.  
4.3.2 China 
China is the world’s most populous country, with 1.3 billion individuals in 2008 (World, 
Bank, 2010c). Due to the one-child policy, China’s annual birth rate is roughly 16 million. In 2007, 
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China was the world’s fourth largest vaccine market, with an estimated CAGR of 15% (Zhou, 
2007). The Chinese public health system provides scheduled vaccines for TB, polio, DTP, measles 
and Hep B as well as ad hoc vaccination for diseases such as JE. The national producer, CNBG, 
produces 90% of the doses required for planned immunization programs. The restricted foreign 
import market is estimated to be only 10% of the total.    
However, the private market is expected to increase. 25% of the world’s cervical cancer 
cases are diagnosed in China. Because limited medical infrastructure in rural areas may preclude 
routine testing for cervical cancer, prevention by vaccination may be more cost-effective than in 
developed countries. The import value of vaccines in 2008 was calculated to be US $526 M 
(Research in China, 2009). 
4.3.3 India 
India’s population of 1.1 billion people makes it the second most populated country in 
the world. Like Brazil, the country’s population is young. The country has the largest birth cohort 
in the world, with 26 million births per year (World Bank, 2010c). India covers the six vaccines 
under the 1979 EPI under the public health plan. However, in some states, vaccine coverage 
rates are below 50%; given the large population, if vaccination were to increase only for EPI 
vaccines, dose demand could double. Like Brazil, an emerging middle class with the ability to 
afford vaccine purchase is creating a private market. However, due to the limited public 
coverage for vaccines, there is a much larger potential for this segment in India. 
India’s middle class is expected to grow from 50 million in 2007 to 583 million in 2025, 
an estimated 41% of the population. With the expansion of the middle class, the demand for 
high quality, complex vaccines will also increase as the willingness to pay increases. This is 
advantageous to the vaccine industry as 80% of Indian healthcare delivery is managed by the 
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private sector (Mukherji, 2005). Expensive vaccines such as HPV will be in high demand as, like 
China, nearly 25% of the world’s cervical cancer patients live in India (Esciencenews, 2010). 
4.3.4 Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is the seventh most populous country in the world, with an estimated 160 
million residents in 2008 and 3.4 million births (World Bank, 2010c). Its population density is one 
of the highest in the world, increasing the risk of rapid spread of infectious disease. 
In collaboration with the WHO, Bangladesh has built a robust vaccination infrastructure.  
Between 1985 and 1995, vaccination coverage of children increased from 2% to 76%. 
Bangladesh’s vaccination schedule for infants includes BCG (to prevent non-pulmonary TB), 
measles vaccine, OPV,   DPT and Hep B, which was added in 2008 with GAVI support. Although 
this introduction came many years after Hep B was available in the western world, access to 
other newer vaccines should be more rapid; Bangladesh’s multiyear vaccination plan also 
intended the introduction of pentavalent vaccines containing Hib in 2008, the first time this 
vaccine would be part of the national vaccination program. The country spent US $7.3 on each 
of 3.7 million infants in 2010. Almost half of the cost of the coverage was borne by the country 
(WHO Bangladesh, 2010). 
Bangladesh is comprised mostly of low-lying plains susceptible to floods. Pools of 
stagnant water are a by-product of the environment and the ideal breeding ground for 
mosquitoes, the vector for both dengue and malaria. Cholera is also endemic to the country. IVI 
tested their cholera vaccine candidate in the capital of Bangladesh (IVI, 2010c). The World Bank 
predicts that Bangladesh may become a middle-income country by 2016. If the economic 
growth continues, any vaccines to these diseases that have reached the market may be 
purchased by a growing middle class on the private market.   
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4.4 Calculating Demand for Low- and Middle- Income Countries 
Because low- and middle- income countries have limited resources for medical 
infrastructure, assessing the need for vaccines can be problematic. One method for calculating 
vaccine demand is to enumerate the number of births and surviving infants in each country. 
However, the percentage of individuals receiving vaccines in developing countries has been very 
low. Over the past two decades, the global health community has worked with countries to 
improve coverage rates to the levels of 80% in most countries (Figure 5). The majority of the 
world’s population resides in low- and middle-income countries. With increased immunization 
coverage rates for newer vaccines, these countries could demand very high volumes of vaccine.   
Figure 5: Vaccine Coverage Rates in Low- and Lower Middle-Income Countries from 1980-2000 
 
Source: Adapted from WHO, 2010a. 
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4.4.1 Priority Vaccines 
In 2007, the WHO selected a group of disease experts to prioritize infectious agents 
based on ten criteria including mortality, economic impact, disease incidence, and long-term 
sequelae.   The analysis revealed diseases that should be global health priorities. The WHO 
defined these disease areas as recommended areas of investment in vaccine R&D (WHO, 
2007b). These were re-categorized by GAVI to reflect those with the biggest impact in the 
developing country perspective, illustrated in Figure 6 (WHO, 2008).  
Figure 6: Evolving Vaccine Pipeline for Developing Countries 
 
Sources: Adapted from GAVI Alliance, 2008; WHO, 2010a. 
Meningococcal B, influenza, varicella, and hepatitis E were not included on the priority 
list for GAVI-eligible countries. Similarly, MVCs removed many of the diseases specific to 
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developing countries from their vaccine R&D pipelines. The common interest of MVCs and 
developing country manufacturers, which has been advantageous for developing country 
markets, is to produce vaccines for diseases that are prevalent globally. However, as vaccines to 
these diseases reach the market worldwide, the product pipeline of HICs begins to diverge from 
that of LICs. MVCs are demanding incentives to develop products that will not serve the public 
sector high-income markets. The need for low-cost developing country manufacturers with an 
interest in developing vaccines that are not appealing to MVCS will increase. 
4.4.2 Demand Forecasting for Low- and Middle-Income Countries 
Challenges with information exchange and knowledge dissemination in the developing 
world currently limit demand for vaccines. Once disease evidence and potential vaccine impact 
data has been generated, those that make the decision to purchase must understand the 
economic impact and funding alternatives related to introducing a new vaccine. These decisions 
need to account for the availability of donor funding, infrastructure requirements, and many 
more fluctuating variables. Thus, a decision to adopt a new vaccine must be considered very 
carefully and action can therefore take months or years. 
Introduction of vaccines is often slow. The initiation of the GAVI Alliance and demand 
creation efforts through Product Development Partnerships (PDPs) have accelerated vaccine 
introduction (GAVI, 2008). In order to continue this trend, increased donor financing and 
significant increases in vaccine production efficiencies will be required. 
As the number of vaccines available increases, financial and capacity restraints will 
further complicate adoption decisions. Many companies, including MVCs, will focus on 
generating vaccines for low-volume, high-price markets when demand uncertainty exists 
(Levine, Kremer & Albright, 2005). Therefore, the importance of regional manufacturers in 
developing countries to provide vaccine solutions for their local markets is critical. 
  
75 
Over time, the global health community has applied knowledge from earlier vaccine 
introductions to reduce the time until vaccines are available in developing countries. As a result, 
newer vaccines are entering low- and middle-income countries earlier in the product’s lifecycle. 
Adoption of new and novel vaccine products may have a great impact on morbidity and 
mortality; however, the products may not have been formulated with optimal levels of 
immunogenicity, dosing, formulation, or duration of effectiveness. Therefore, new vaccines may 
require high dosing requirements, multiple boosts, or administration to older children or adults 
who are not part of the standard vaccination system. The requirements will further complicate 
immunization practices where there is limited medical infrastructure, further affecting the 
confidence of demand forecasting. This uncertainty makes negotiations to lower vaccine price 
difficult, and for high-cost vaccines, manufacturers may not engage in price negotiation at all. 
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5: THE CHALLENGES TO VACCINE ACCESS FOR LOW- AND 
MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 
As we have outlined in the previous chapter, there is a large demand for vaccines in low- 
and middle-income countries. The key differential between such countries and high-income 
nations is the degree to which the free market meets demand. Access to medical intervention is 
unequal between the developing and developed worlds. While vaccination rates for old vaccines 
generally approach that of the US and Europe, this is not the case for new vaccines. The lag 
between vaccine licensure in the US or Europe and distribution in poor countries is typically 10-
15 years (Breitstien, 2009). This exacerbates differences in disease specific mortalities by income 
level, as illustrated in Table 5. For example, the current use of vaccines against diarrhoeal 
diseases in high-income countries means that there are 1.3 deaths for every 100,000 individuals. 
In contrast, in low-income countries, almost none of whom have access to rotavirus vaccines, 
there are 55 deaths per 1000,000 people per year due to diarrhoeal disease. Collectively, 
greater than 76% of deaths related to these diseases occur in lower- middle-income and low-
income countries.  
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Table 5: Projected mortality by cause and income group, 2008 
YEAR OF 
VACCINE 
AVAILABILITY 
(WHO PQ) CAUSE HIGH-INCOME 
UPPER-MIDDLE 
INCOME 
LOWER-
MIDDLE-
INCOME 
LOW- 
INCOME 
2016 HIV/AIDS 29,239 453,681 189,832 1,569,845 
2015 Dengue 125 209 5,160 7,405 
2014 Malaria 193 2,039 39,542 795,850 
2012 Typhoid* 13,341 28,095 224,958 1,420,821 
2009 Cholera* 13,341 28,095 224,958 1,420,821 
2009 Japanese encephalitis 19 166 3,911 9,461 
2009 Meningitis 2,998 8,317 47,119 211,689 
2004 Rotavirus* 13,341 28,095 224,958 1,420,821 
1981 Hepatitis B 6,144 3,554 31,694 47,259 
1963 Measles 15 582 24,617 302,527 
1963 Polio 628 33 95 339 
1948 Tetanus 118 262 14,032 113,847 
1948 Diphtheria 0 67 195 3,672 
1948 Pertussis 39 856 7,229 185,972 
1926 Tuberculosis 13,463 64,977 356,349 815,184 
Population (000) 990,793 588,913 2,526,554 2,594,318 
*Total deaths due to 
diarrhoeal diseases 
Sources: Adapted from WHO, 2010b.     
 
 The reasons for this inequity are many. Firstly, the very classification of countries as 
low- and middle-income highlights their limited ability to pay for medication. While vaccination 
is one of the most cost-efficient medical interventions available, the high price demanded for 
innovation means that new vaccines can cost as much as 1000 times that of old vaccines. While 
the five MVCs have engaged in some differential pricing for low- and middle-income countries, 
to date direct-country negotiation has only regularly occurred with countries where there are 
other incentives for the MVC, such as exclusive access to a large population.  When MVCs do 
price negotiate with individual developing countries, they typically do not disclose the agreed 
price publicly. Therefore, countries with similar per-capita incomes may pay very different 
prices. As a result, countries may be reluctant to negotiate at all. If they do, they may be unable 
  
to commit to multi-year purchases due to economic volatility
emerging countries also limits the ability to guarantee purchases, contributing to MVC 
reluctance to participate in developing world markets.
As illustrated in figure 7
predicted for the next 40 years. 
but current vaccine production levels are not 
The majority of the world’s population lives in developing countries; birth cohorts are also a 
proportionally larger percentage of the population
Figure 7: Population by major geographic
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Therefore, the number of vaccine doses required 
production, as demonstrated in Figure 8
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future demand will be even more limited
bought by low- and middle- income countries, there is often not sufficient incentive for MVC
expand capacity.  
Figure 8: Population by development region, 1950
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is limited. Vaccine shortages like the H1N1 pandemic influenza in 2009-2010 will continue if 
current capacity is not increased, and they will disproportionally affect poor countries.  
Even when the capacity is available, the format of vaccine doses used in the developed 
world often does not meet the needs of the developing world. As outlined in Chapter 3, the 
MVCs have no incentive to invest in innovations unless the resulting differentiation increases 
profit margin or accesses to another market segment in high-income countries. The risk of 
unstable markets and low margins also deter MVCs from investing in new vaccine development 
for diseases that predominate in developing countries. Local suppliers in developing countries 
usually have limited R&D experience and financial resources to develop these vaccines 
independently. With international travel as a commonplace event, and changes to global 
climate, some of these diseases will expand to become global concerns unless there is near-term 
intervention. 
Population growth in the developing world illustrates the need for increased vaccine 
supply to low- and middle-income countries. Though the challenges to adequate supply in the 
free market are many, the public-health benefit of vaccines has meant that there are many 
innovative incentives available for improved vaccine development and access. While such 
market support is clearly needed, the pace of change is still insufficient. In Chapters 6 & 7, we 
will evaluate the current models used to improve vaccine supply. We will assess their cost as 
well as their ability to build sustainable vaccine industry infrastructure and recommend whether 
they should be continued, modified or abandoned. We will propose models not yet in practice. 
Finally, we will make strategic recommendations on a complementary model to improve vaccine 
development and access for the future.  
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6: ESTABLISHED VACCINE ACCESS SYSTEMS 
Equitable vaccine access for the developing world has been supported since the 1930s, 
when the Rockefeller Institute in New York transferred technology for the manufacture of 
yellow fever vaccine to Brazil (Neto & Jayaraman, 2009). In the 1970s, organizations such as the 
WHO have developed international programs to improve vaccine use in low- and middle- 
income countries. There have also been longstanding free-market practices that have allowed 
eventual access to vaccines, and some MVCs have donated doses under specific circumstances. 
In this chapter, we will provide a brief history of longstanding vaccine access systems, and 
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of ongoing programs from supranational organizations. 
6.1 History of Supranational Support for Vaccines 
Until 2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations International 
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) led the management of global vaccination initiatives. In 
1974, the WHO launched the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI). This program gave 
global guidelines for recommended childhood vaccines and a schedule for their administration. 
The expanded list added polio, measles and tuberculosis vaccinations to those against already 
suggested for diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus (GAVI, 2010). Smallpox was eradicated after an 
intensified vaccination eradication effort between 1967 and 1977. 
6.2 Supranational Programs 
For decades, the UN has played a central role in providing access to vaccines for low-
resource economies across the globe. With the influence of the BMGF over the last 15 years, the 
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UN now also works in partnership with private and NFP organizations. Their predominant role is 
in procurement and health systems strengthening for the developing world. Significant UN 
programs that aid access to high-quality vaccines are described below. 
6.2.1 UNICEF Procurement 
The UNICEF Supply Division purchases vaccines using funds from a variety of sources.  
These include GAVI funds and contributions from recipient nations. In 2007, UNICEF spent 
approximately $620 M on vaccines for children in almost 100 countries (UNICEF, 2010b).  
Because UNICEF procures mostly low-cost vaccines and receives differential pricing from 
suppliers, this money purchases 40% of the total global vaccine doses used annually. The 
UNICEF Supply Division generally procures for all low- and middle-income countries eligible for 
GAVI funding, unless the nation is able to procure through Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO’s) Revolving Fund. Both GAVI and PAHO are described below. UNICEF charges a handling 
fee of 3-4.5% for vaccine procurement, depending on the vaccine type and country income 
level. The total funds for the vaccine must be deposited with UNICEF before the vaccines are 
purchased. This can be an onerous requirement for poor countries.  
 UNICEF also tries, where possible, to purchase from multiple manufacturers to 
strengthen the security of vaccine supply (IAVI, 2008b). As an example, they procured from all 
the prequalified manufacturers of pentavalent vaccine in their last purchasing cycle. While this 
approach is commendable for ensuring a consistent supply, it can prevent recipient countries 
from receiving the formulation of the vaccine best suited to the needs of the country. 
6.2.2 PAHO Procurement 
PAHO’s “Revolving Fund” for vaccine procurement was created in 1979 to assist in 
stabilizing vaccine access for the Americas. There are 37 member states in PAHO, most of whose 
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annual GDP excludes them from gaining access to GAVI funding (IAVI, 2008b). The PAHO 
Revolving Fund offers several advantages over UNICEF’s procurement process. Firstly, unless the 
country requires a large amount of doses, funds need not be deposited into the Revolving Fund 
before procurement begins. Secondly, the administrative fees are lower than of UNICEF. As 
shown in Table 6, PAHO’s bulk procurement has lowered prices for its members. Prices are now 
often equivalent to those received by GAVI. 
Table 6: Vaccine Price Per Dose Comparison 2010, US $ 
Vaccine US CDC  GAVI  PAHO 
Pentavalent, fully liquid n/a 3.01 3.20 
Hib 8.83 3.40 2.25 
Pneumococcal conjugate 91.75 7.00 20.00 
Yellow Fever-10 n/a 0.90 1.15 
Rotavirus 2 dose scheme 83.75 n/a 7.50 
Sources: CDC, 2010c; UNICEF, 2010c; PAHO, 2010 
Recently, PAHO’s vaccine procurement prices have been challenged. The organization’s 
mandate is to receive the lowest price possible for vaccines. GAVI also demands the same.  
However, the majority of the countries that the PAHO serves are middle-income countries. 
MVCs recognize that middle-income countries may be their best source of profit growth, and 
are no longer willing to discount their prices for PAHO at the same level as they would for GAVI-
funded low-income countries. This is problematic because there is often income inequity within 
the PAHO countries, so that some regions or individuals cannot afford an increase in vaccine 
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price. PAHO is now re-evaluating their procurement strategy. This will ideally allow price 
differentiation between low- and middle-income countries while still allowing robust vaccination 
coverage rates in countries of both income level (Medical News Today, 2009c). 
Despite this negotiating issue, PAHO has benefited its 37 member states by pooling 
vaccine requests to maximize negotiating power and to standardize annual demand. We believe 
this model may work well for other geographic regions that contain middle-income countries 
who cannot procure through GAVI. 
6.2.3 WHO Programs 
Since 1989, the WHO has had a program to assess the safety of vaccines supplied to UN 
agencies and other supranational partners (WHO, 2006). A prequalification process for delivery 
devices was initiated in 2005 (IAVI, 2008b). 
 The WHO provides extensive guidelines that must be met for a vaccine to be considered 
for prequalification. For countries that produce vaccines, the NRA must carry out the following 
six functions independently, with the power to enforce: 
• a published set of requirements for licensing;  
• surveillance of vaccine field performance;  
• system of lot release;  
• use of laboratory when needed;  
• regular inspections for GMP, and  
• evaluation of clinical performance (WHO, 2010c). 
The recognized NRA must approve the vaccine for domestic use before the manufacturer can 
apply for prequalification.  
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The prequalification process includes inspections of the vaccine production facilities 
additional to those done by the NRA. These inspections focus on adherence to Good 
Manufacturing Practices (GMP). This is a set of guidelines internationally recognized by 
manufacturers and regulatory authorities as necessary for the quality manufacture of medicines. 
Another criterion is batch testing of samples from at least three lots of the vaccine for 
consistency. Prequalification is awarded for a period of 2 years, but can be extended to five if no 
manufacturing issues have occurred in the two-year period. 
The WHO also has a mandate to strengthen NRAs across the globe. This has included the 
WHO-initiated formation of the Developing Countries’ Vaccine Regulators Network, which is a 
group of representatives from fully functional NRAs that discuss trials appropriate for vaccines in 
their countries. This has proven uniquely valuable as the network identified a potential 
interaction issue between the rotavirus vaccine and oral polio vaccine; since OPV is not used in 
developed countries, this consideration would not have been made by those NRAs (Nishioka, 
2008). The WHO also offers a training network for vaccine quality; to date, more than 300 
vaccine industry affiliates have participated (WHO, 2010d). The country that produces the most 
vaccines, China, does not have a recognized NRA, and for this reason cannot sell their vaccines 
to UNICEF. The WHO is assisting China in building internal capabilities to establish an NRA.  
Given China’s manufacturing dose capacity, building regulatory capability could dramatically 
increase vaccine supply.  This process should be continued. 
6.3 Differential Pricing  
 Differential or tiered pricing has greatly facilitated vaccine access for low- and middle-
income countries. All the MVCs engage in differential pricing (Plahte, 2005). The concept of 
differential pricing is to charge customers based on their ability or willingness to pay. Differential 
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pricing is a widely accepted method of revenue maximization (Miravete, 2005). For vaccines, 
high-income countries generate the maximum profits (Plahte, 2005). Additional revenues are 
made on lower margins from lower income countries. Pricing has been significantly 
differentiated for vaccines purchased through UNICEF and PAHO, where large volume purchases 
also facilitate buyer power. Prices for the six basic vaccines recommended by the EPI and 
procured through UNICEF and PAHO are less than 10% by high-income countries.    
There are two main factors affecting the vaccine price: production volume and product 
life- cycle stage. Given that manufacturing costs are predominantly fixed, the higher the volume 
of production, the lower the cost. New vaccines always have initial high prices, to recover the 
investment on R&D, clinical trials, manufacturing facility and marketing. In the past, vaccine 
prices only dropped to a level of affordability for low- and middle-income markets after 
recovering the cost of investment. Typically, it would take 15-20 years for a vaccine to reach a 
life cycle stage where developing countries could afford it. With low returns on older vaccines, 
MVCs are switching to production of higher value vaccines. These often have complex 
manufacturing processes that diminish production capacity, resulting in higher prices. 
Additionally, vaccines for diseases that are not endemic in the developed world will not be 
candidates for differential pricing. This further highlights the need for regional vaccine 
development programs.        
 Bulk procurement by UNICEF means lower transaction costs and lower vaccine prices. 
UNICEF, PAHO and other pooled procurement organizations should work together to develop 
joint strategies to maintain and broaden differential pricing policy. The bids by MVCs for the 
pneumococcal AMC, described in section 7.1.12, suggest that guaranteed demand over the 
long-term facilitates differential pricing.  
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Maintenance of differential pricing will be especially important in the near term, as 
some lower-middle-income countries are about to become ineligible for GAVI support and 
access to GAVI vaccine prices.       
6.4 Vaccine Donations 
In 2007, Merck provided the first donation of a vaccine that had been licensed for high-
income country markets in the same year. In 2005, there was an outbreak of rotavirus in 
Nicaragua. While the country could not afford the new vaccine, they agreed to be a partner in 
assessing the outcome of a vaccination program in an environment with limited medical 
infrastructure. Merck, in turn, donated three year’s worth of Rotateq to the country. In 2009, 
Wyeth contributed a newer vaccine for another significant disease agent. 3.1 million doses of 
Prevnar 7 were donated through GAVI to the Gambia and Rwanda, the first two countries in 
Africa to introduce this vaccine (GAVI, 2009). Recognizing the seriousness of pandemic influenza, 
in 2007, GSK and Sanofi donated a combined 110 million doses of H5N1 vaccine to the WHO’s 
stockpile initiative. These vaccines were distributed to low-income countries (Medical News 
Today, 2007; Johnson, 2009).   
While these donations are significant, they are predominately for the purpose of 
demonstration. For newer vaccines, the ultimate purpose is to model successful vaccine usage in 
low resource settings in order to facilitate uptake in other low- and middle-income nations.  
Merck explicitly discussed assessment of the public health benefits of early adoption as a 
component of the project (Merck, 2009). While it is highly commendable that Merck and other 
manufacturers engage in long-term donations to make the benefits and limitations of vaccine 
use transparent, it is not a sustainable model for ongoing vaccine access to the broader low-
income market, as it is dependent on the need of the manufacturer to make a case for 
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purchasing the vaccine. It may also have the unintended consequence of delaying introduction 
to other low-resource countries until the benefits are ‘proven’. While we recognize the value of 
vaccine donations for modelling efficacy in low-resource settings, we recommend that phase III 
trials be run concurrently with ones in high-income countries, so that speed to access can be 
optimal.  
In the long-term, dependence on donations is not a viable mechanism for improving 
vaccine access. In seasonal products, such as flu vaccines and commoditized vaccines, MVCs can 
donate at relatively little net cost. Donation is not a reliable source of vaccines as this is often 
dependent on an oversupply from the free market. It is unlikely that newer vaccines will be 
donated until developmental and capital costs are recovered. Lastly, vaccine donations 
contribute little to capacity in developing countries or to strengthening global vaccine supply. 
The established mechanisms for vaccine supply are generally positive and should be 
continued. However, in their current form and capacity, they have not truly equalized access to 
vaccines. In the next section, we will examine newer initiatives that are working to increase 
access to vaccines. 
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7: ALTERNATIVE ACCESS MODELS 
In addition to long-term efforts from MVCs and supranational organizations, there are 
other newer models intended to provide vaccine access to low- and middle-income countries. In 
this chapter, we analyse such models to understand their strategic importance. Furthermore, 
we will propose and discuss a new model that can support sustainable vaccine development 
that meets developing country demands.  
7.1 Public – Private Partnerships 
A Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) is a relationship between at least one public and one 
private organization, where both groups share the risks and benefits (Widdus, 2003; Buse & 
Walt, 2000). Vaccine development by public entities dates back to US President Roosevelt’s “The 
March of Dimes” foundation, which supported the successful development of the first polio 
vaccine (March of Dimes, 2010). Since then, there have been number of PPPs that have 
delivered cost-effective vaccines for the developing world. Partnerships are economically 
efficient as they share risk and cost between the parties involved.    
The global health community is greatly interested in the development of new vaccines 
against malaria, tuberculosis, diarrheal diseases, and HIV/AIDS. While these diseases kill 
thousands of people each day, the most affected countries lack sufficient purchasing power to 
incent robust efforts for vaccine development. The need for PPPs to generate such vaccines is 
due to the lack of traditional free market forces that encourage market-based innovation, or 
market failure (Rangan, Van Wassenhove & Samii, 2003). Private-sector investment in R&D 
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efforts is unlikely when the financial returns are low and even unpredictable (Sciencebase, 
2010).  
Economic theory assumes that a perfectly competitive market is driven by self-regulated 
mechanisms of supply and demand. However, the vaccine market fails for developing countries 
as it suffers from information asymmetry (the manufacturer has more information than the 
purchaser), bounded rationality (not all problems are known and can be accounted for), and 
potential opportunism (promotion of perceived self-interest, for example, MVC set high prices 
that make vaccines unaffordable) (Rice, 1998; Slater and Tonkiss, 2001). The extent of these 
problems leads to very high transactions costs in developing new vaccines for the developing 
world, where private companies are not willing to take on the burden. PPPs are useful when 
there is a significant public benefit and profit uncertainty is high for private companies. A public 
partner can minimize the high transaction costs of governance, contract management, 
intellectual property management, clinical trial management, and regulatory affairs using public 
resources (Rangan, Van Wassenhove & Samii, 2003).  For diseases such as malaria and AIDS/HIV 
with particularly heavy disease burden, there should be a near-term global response with both 
public and the private sector working together. MVCs are beginning to place value on neglected 
diseases drug development. The companies see benefits in fulfilling increased public demand for 
corporate social responsibility, strengthening their access to low-cost resources and highly 
skilled researchers in the near-term and increasing margins as the economies develop over the 
long-term. As emerging economies strengthen, free market vaccine development may be able 
to predominate. 
Unlike in infrastructure PPPs where governments are looking to transfer risk to private 
companies (Vining & Boardman, 2008), vaccine PPPs take on risk to encourage private 
companies to develop new disease prevention solutions. Their mandate is often to fund high-
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risk and high-cost projects to develop vaccines targeting the developing world demand. A well-
developed PPP with clear objectives and strategies will help to ensure returns for both public 
and private partners. This is especially important for global vaccine PPPs initiatives, where 
governments and companies from many nations are involved.  
The most appropriate place to conduct research and clinical trials for vaccines targeting 
the developing world is in the disease-affected regions. Vaccine efficacy can vary dramatically 
for those with underlying health issues such as malnutrition or chronic endemic infections. 
However, a major obstacle for clinical trials in many developing countries is poor medical 
facilities and lack of regulatory systems to oversee safety practices. The participation of global 
health organizations brings a diverse set of expertise and resources. They can bridge the gap 
between free-market industry and emerging economies to reach a common goal of delivering 
vaccines for neglected, preventable diseases.  
It is also important to recognize that PPPs may not be desirable when there is inequity 
and ethical dilemmas related to the population that they intend to benefit. There is concern that 
some countries are chosen because of favourable geographical, social and political 
considerations (Walt & Buse, 2000). Therefore, it is imperative that the developing country 
partner selection process is governed by ethical and social principles.  
One of the major concerns about vaccination related PPPs is the drive towards cost-
effective, rapid results. While this seems positive in many aspects, there is a risk that the focus 
will be on short-term interventions rather than long-term improvement for the health care 
system as a whole. Therefore, PPPs have to consider sustainability when developing project 
goals (Martens, 2007). The funding has to be carefully allocated in order to gain the maximum 
benefit. There are two types of PPPs that contribute to vaccine access: financing and product 
development partnerships.   
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7.1.1 Financing Partnerships: GAVI 
Recognizing a desire to provide more rapid access to vaccines in the developing world, 
the Global Alliance for Vaccine Initiative (GAVI) was begun in 2000 (Diamond, 2005).  A US $750 
M grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) seeded the organization; within 5 
years, donor funds from wealthy governments and matching funds from private donors 
matched the initial amount. In addition to BMGF, GAVI membership included the WHO and 
UNICEF, government representatives, and for-profit vaccine manufacturers. The Alliance’s initial 
focus was to improve access to vaccines beyond those in the 1974 EPI, including yellow fever, 
Hib and Hep B vaccines. While the price of the three ‘original’ vaccines combined was less than 
$1, Hib and Hep B cost significantly more, putting them out of reach for low-income countries. 
Financing of vaccines became GAVI’s key mandate while UNICEF continued to procure the 
majority of vaccines with funds from GAVI.    
GAVI has provided support to countries based on their 2003 GNI. However, their criteria 
are about to change. Eligibility for assistance will be limited to countries with per capita GNI less 
than US $1500 (GAVI, 2010). This change reduces the number of eligible countries from 72 to 
58, excluding countries such as India. However, the latest poverty report from UNDP shows that 
with 421 million poor people, India has more individuals below the poverty line than all the 
African countries combined. The GAVI policy will challenge access to current differential vaccine 
prices and may even risk current supply levels (BBC, 2010). 
Over the past decade, GAVI has created several initiatives that utilize market forces to 
fund these efforts. They are as follows: 
7.1.1.1 International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm) 
This program launched in 2006. The IFFIm issues bonds that are based on legally binding 
long-term financial commitments from high-income country governments, transforming the 
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pledges into immediate cash. As of the third quarter of 2009, the IFFIm raised over US $2 B, of 
which GAVI has disbursed $1.2 B. This has doubled the organization’s purchasing power (IFFIm, 
2009). Highlights of funding allocation include: 
a) Purchase of reformulated multivalent vaccines; 
b) Polio vaccine purchase as part of efforts to complete eradication of the disease 
c) 1/3 of the funds were allocated to purchase of new and underused vaccines 
Despite concerns about the impact of the global recession on the IFFIm, four countries initiated 
or added funds for the IFFIm in 2009; US $1.1 B was raised on bond issuances.  
7.1.1.2 Advanced Market Commitments 
The Advanced Market Commitment (AMC) program is a mechanism designed to ‘pull’ 
vaccine development into the market. It encourages the development of vaccines for the 
developing world through long-term financial commitment. It also reduces the lag time before a 
new vaccine reaches the developing country markets. Bidding manufacturers commit a set 
amount of supply over a number of years. Manufacturers receive a higher price per dose in the 
early years of the commitment, and lower per-dose prices once AMC funds are depleted. 
Pneumococcal vaccines were chosen for an AMC pilot study. In February of 2007, five donor 
countries - Canada, Italy, Russia, Norway, and the UK, as well as the BMGF - contributed a 
combined $1.5 B to the pneumococcal AMC. In 2009, requests for manufacturing offers were 
made. Four manufacturers placed bids within a month of the initial request: GSK, Pfizer, Serum 
Institute of India, and Panacea Biotec. In March of 2010, GSK and Pfizer were each awarded 
contracts to produce up to 30 million doses per year for 10 years. Under the terms of the 
contract, they will be paid $7 per dose until AMC funds are depleted; this will then drop to $3.50 
per dose for the remainder of the contract. In developed countries, pneumococcal vaccines sell 
for $50-60 / dose. The AMC provided immunogenicity, formulation, and delivery specifications 
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in a target product profile prior to soliciting manufacturing bids (AMC, 2008). This suggests the 
significant buying power afforded when purchases are made in high volume. Additionally, GSK 
announced that it would open a second manufacturing plant for Synflorix in Singapore shortly 
after receiving the AMC contract.   
The AMC has come under criticism for failing to negotiate vaccine prices to be low 
enough to allow purchase by LICs (Pollack, 2010). In 2009, Brazil and GSK signed a pneumococcal 
vaccine purchase agreement where the vaccine was discounted to $17.50/dose in exchange for 
a long-term commitment to purchase, suggesting that the $3.50 price per dose will approach 
affordability for all but the poorest countries (Neto & Jayaraman, 2009).   
The AMC has also been criticized for providing financial incentive exclusively at the post-
marketing stage, rather than encouraging vaccine R&D for unaddressed diseases. It is also not 
clear why the two MVCs were awarded AMC funds before the Indian manufacturers. If the pilot 
is successful in accelerating access to developing countries, the choice of the next disease target 
will address or heighten this concern. A malaria vaccine AMC has been proposed. If vaccines for 
this disease were to be the next candidate for AMC funds, funding should not go to 
manufacturers who have also received ‘push’ funding through the Malaria Vaccine Initiative for 
their R&D.    
7.2 Product Development Partnerships (PDPs)   
A Product Development Partnership (PDP) is a specific type of PPP mandated to develop 
a new drug or vaccine. Often, no single entity has the resources, intellectual property, and 
knowledge to undertake all activities in the value chain for vaccine development. However, 
collaborations within a group can achieve more by pooling resources (Bazzoli et al., 1997). In a 
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PPP, the public partner typically provides funding incentives to the private partner in exchange 
for access to their drug development knowledge and infrastructure.  
Push and pull funding mechanisms are drivers of successful PDPs. Push mechanisms 
operate in the research and development stages of the value chain. Public partners contribute 
policy assistance and direct research funding to reduce the risk to the private entity. Companies 
can focus on early-stage discovery activities where their expenses are reduced in a way that is 
attractive to shareholders. They can also conduct expensive late-stage development activities in 
collaboration with the public partner. Pull mechanisms operate in later development stages 
through creating market opportunities. Pull mechanisms include assured priority regulatory 
review by robust NRAs and guaranteed procurement contracts upon licensing approval. These 
funding mechanisms are considered “social venture capital” that brings affordable treatments 
and preventive mechanisms to the developing country markets (Wheeler & Berkley, 2001). Like 
true venture capital contracts, deals structures are designed to align investments with project 
goals. PDP partners are accountable for their actions and financial management.        
The main goal of a PDP is to develop a new vaccine or a delivery technology that has 
been neglected by the free market. This is achieved through funding MVCs to develop new 
vaccines or building a specific PDP consisting of private companies and public entities. The 
development process can also build vaccine development capacity within a developing country 
or region. PDPs can assemble bridging social and financial capital from various parts of the world 
for a common goal (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). This can provide sustainable infrastructure for 
future development, innovation, and economic growth.   
7.2.1 Funding MVC Programs- Malaria Vaccine Initiative RTS,S 
MVCs have little interest in developing vaccines for a market where the returns might 
not justify the investment. The drug industry often abandons such products due to the lack of 
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commercial market. PDPs with funding from public sources can re-initiate development on such 
products. Work prior to PDP investment often means that the path to licensure is shorter and 
less risky than for de novo development. PDPs with MVCs are strategically important in 
accessing potentially successful vaccine candidates for late stage development. The partnership 
between the Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI) and GSK is an example of a PDP that has re-
initiated development on a vaccine candidate (Malaria Vaccine, 2010).  
MVI is a PATH initiative established with a US $200 M grant from the Gates Foundation 
to accelerate the discovery of a malaria vaccine. MVI also has the mandate to make the vaccine 
available at an affordable price to low-income countries. In 1987, GSK invented the anti-malaria 
RTS,S vaccine candidate (Ballou & Cahill, 2007). However, this project progressed at a very slow 
pace until GSK and PATH signed a collaboration agreement in 2001 to pursue the paediatric 
clinical development of RTS,S in Africa.  
There were 247 million reported cases and nearly a million deaths attributed to malaria 
in 2008 (WHO, 2010e). Malarial disease disproportionally affects children. In Africa alone, a child 
dies every 45 seconds from malaria, accounting for 20% of all childhood deaths. The morbidity 
associated with the illness has a profound economic and social impact, impeding normal 
childhood development. Given these facts, an urgent solution is required.  
MVI is providing finances and trial expertise for phase III trials in Africa to support GSK’s 
development efforts. African researchers and collaborating institutions in seven countries have 
joined the partnership. Under the current plans, RTS,S will be submitted for regulatory approval 
in 2012 with marketing in 2013 (GSK, 2010e). Under the partnership, GSK has agreed to set the 
price just above the cost. The small return will be invested in next generation malaria-vaccine 
research. GSK recently announced that at least 12.5 million doses would be donated to PATH for 
distribution in developing countries (PATH, 2010c).  
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Initial phase II results demonstrated a reduction of clinical malaria episodes by 53% over 
an 8 month follow-up period (Sciencecodex, 2009). This is a low efficacy rate compared to other 
marketed vaccines. However, considering the social and economic impact of malaria in the 
African continent, this is the best option for medical intervention in malaria today. If the vaccine 
is licensed, GSK has the opportunity to sell to travellers and the military, which are both high 
margin markets.  
The MVI is also supporting earlier vaccine candidates that may provide greater efficacy 
or lower cost. A significant benefit for these second-generation vaccines is that tests often have 
been designed to correlate a biomarker with successful protective immunity for the first 
vaccine. If such a correlate assay is available, then other vaccines are usually assessed against 
the correlate, rather than waiting for months or years to see if vaccinated individuals become 
infected with the disease agent. Trials can therefore be smaller and shorter.   
The success of the partnership with GSK will be clearer if and when the RTS,S vaccine is 
licensed. PDPs can often be more effective when the partnership occurs at an earlier 
development stage, as there is more ability to negotiate the target product profile. The 
development process may also be streamlined if public partner involvement facilitates 
application for accelerated regulatory review, etc. We will explore some of these examples in 
the next section. 
7.2.2 Developing Products and Capacity through Emerging Economy Partnerships 
 Vaccine development for neglected diseases is best achieved by collaborating with local 
companies. Global health organizations and wealthy government agencies have the best 
knowledge about these types of disease conditions and patient management. These groups 
have the resources and knowledge to work in regions where certain diseases are prevalent and 
develop evidence-based policy recommendations. Because of experience working with 
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communities, public organizations are well equipped to train personnel, recruit trial candidates, 
and manage clinical trials. Private companies hold a complementary set of skills required for 
vaccine innovation. Companies are stronger in scientific knowledge, technical and research 
capabilities, preclinical trial experience, manufacturing expertise, and commercialization 
capabilities. Combining these complementary strengths leads to rapid vaccine development. 
Though we make the distinction of different strengths brought to the partnership by public and 
private entities, both may be proficient in all parts of the vaccine development value chain. The 
roles each partner in a PDP changes over time as the vaccine progresses through the value 
chain. The partner who has the stronger skills set at a particular stage will take on a dominant 
role. Through realistic timelines and open communication of expectations and setbacks, PDPs 
can achieve major developmental milestones.   
Capacity building is the major by-product of PDPs. There are several examples where 
the developing country private partner gained capabilities that enabled competition in the free 
market. Knowledge exchange and infrastructure support have been the main benefits for 
developing economies (Hovland, 2003). In the past, international development work has 
focused on infrastructure support and training programs with a short-term vision. We believe 
that knowledge transfer has a long-term impact. Promoting local science and innovation will 
create economic growth and industrial competitiveness (Nuyens, 2007). However, capacity 
building is not limited to scientific training, but also requires physical infrastructure, 
management and organizational capacity, political, economical, and social support (Csazzar & 
Lal, 2004). In the following sections, we examine different areas of capacity building in the 
vaccine value chain and highlight where capacity building has occurred in several PDP cases.  
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7.2.2.1 Research and Development 
R&D is the driving force behind any innovative company. Without innovation, 
companies lose competitive advantage. R&D capabilities in the emerging economies are limited 
in comparison with the developed world (Nuyens, 2007). The disparity makes it difficult for 
these countries to compete with developed countries. As a majority of the early stage 
discoveries take place in academic and government institutes, these organizations also need 
assistance with capacity building. In order to ensure that disease research focused on vaccine 
development is maintained, research should be carried out within a region affected by the 
disease. Therefore, indigenizing vaccine R&D is an essential component for improving healthcare 
and economic status.  
 PDPs have been successful in integrating academic and industry partner capabilities in a 
way that develops an expanded set of skills useful beyond the scope of a single project. 
Academic collaborations can lead to discoveries for other neglected diseases that were not in 
the original scope of the project. Accumulating a critical mass of knowledge and expertise will 
help to make a sustainable research industry for these diseases.    
Developing regional disease vaccines is critical public health goal (Scidev, 2009). For 
example, different types of meningococcal sub-species exist in different regions of the world. 
While three manufacturers sell a vaccine for the meningococcal strain that predominates in 
Europe since 2001, development of a vaccine against the strain predominant in sub-Saharan 
Africa required a PDP involvement, as described in section 7.2.2.6 (Jodar et al., 2003). Building 
early stage research capacity through PDPs is essential to identify pathogens in the native 
environment with the help of local experts. PPPs such as the International Vaccine Initiative 
(IVI), described below, are actively involved in building on local talent with knowledge exchange 
and infrastructure support.  
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7.2.2.2 Manufacturing 
As we have discussed previously, vaccine-manufacturing facilities are the main capital 
cost in the vaccine value chain. As GMP and regulatory standards evolve, these costs continue to 
rise. Historically, the lack of reliable vaccine demand forecasting from developing countries had 
made it risky for the MVCs to make investments specific to those countries. One way to address 
this issue is by building manufacturing capacity within developing countries. Access to 
technologies required for newer complex vaccines are not readily available. Though some 
developing country manufacturers in India, China and Brazil are investing more resources 
towards closing this technological gap, their capabilities still lag the MVCs.  Because vaccines are 
comprised of biological materials, there is no generic regulatory pathway and similar vaccines 
must be tested in new clinical trials. Technology and expertise is specific for each manufacturing 
process. In addition, intellectual property barriers may delay developing country manufactures 
gaining capabilities for an extended period (Milstein, Gaule & Kaddar, 2007).   
Through PDPs, private companies can gain access to technologies and expertise that will 
give capabilities to manufacture newer vaccines. Technology transfer or innovation partnerships 
can help developing companies in bridging the technology and build manufacturing capabilities. 
Furthermore, public entities can be successful in providing resources and assistance to carry out 
R&D work to improve older vaccine technologies. Ideally, PDPs help private companies gain 
manufacturing capabilities that extend beyond the partnership period. As discussed in the case 
analysis of PATH’s MVP project below, the Serum Institute of India gained a new manufacturing 
technology in the partnership. 
Unfortunately, some PDPs are engaged in ad hoc knowledge transfer of expertise and 
infrastructure (Ziemba, 2005). There is little coordination between different vaccine 
development projects to maximize the value of their resources.  There is an opportunity for 
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PDPs to exploit other PDP infrastructure while assisting local governments to develop regulatory 
and ethical review capacity 
7.2.2.3 Clinical Trial Infrastructure 
Clinical trials must always be conducted with participants from the region where the 
target disease in prevalent, especially if there are differences in the sub-species of the pathogen. 
HIV/AIDS vaccine trials against non-clade B strains of the virus are best conducted in the African 
continent, where these clades predominate. Clinical trials can be effectively managed by training 
and building local expertise to recruit patients, administer the vaccine, monitor the subjects and 
collect data. Knowledgeable local teams have a better understanding of the diseases that affect 
the region as well as cultural norms important for appropriate interactions with those that 
volunteer for trial studies (Timmermans, 2005). Since the main links between the test vaccine 
and the study participants are local doctors and healthcare workers, successful recruitment and 
monitoring requires local cultural intelligence. Once a particular vaccine project is completed, 
the trial capacity left behind is invaluable for other vaccine or drug development projects. For 
example, IAVI has actively built clinical trial sites for many of its vaccine development programs.  
These resources stimulate the local economy, as well as building expertise for the testing of 
future vaccine candidates.  
7.2.2.4 Regulatory 
Safety standards for vaccines have become extremely stringent in the past couple of 
decades. Developed countries are more concerned and increasingly intolerant to vaccine side 
effects even if exceedingly rare. It is important to consider that the acceptable risk profile for 
developing countries may be different, where a disease is more prevalent and the disease 
outcome more severe. However, maintaining different safely standards for developed and 
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developing countries is problematic. A good example of this is Wyeth’s rotavirus vaccine, 
RotaShield. One year after approval in US, the vaccine was withdrawn from market after 15 
children developed serious side effects. Because of this safely concern, developing countries 
were also unwilling to use the vaccine although an estimated 1.5 M children die from rotavirus 
infection annually in low- and lower- middle- income countries (WHO, 2010b).   
Any vaccine sold in a foreign country must gain approval from the NRA of the country of 
manufacture. Vaccines procured through UN organizations have to meet additional regulatory 
standards. To gain WHO prequalification status, the manufacturing processes need to meet 
WHO regulatory standards. However, many middle- and low-income countries do not have the 
regulatory bodies that meet global standards nor have the expertise to gain such status. Global 
health public partners are well positioned access regulatory expertise for vaccines. 
Organizations such as IAVI and PATH are actively engaged in helping developing countries gain 
regulatory expertise.  PDPs and WHO programs can focus capacity building through achievable 
goals such as harmonized regulatory guidelines for clinical trials and streamlined licensing 
procedures.  
7.2.2.5 Commercialization 
Vaccine commercialization can be a difficult task for a developing country manufacturer. 
Usually, the Ministry of Health in each country manages demand generation in developing 
country markets and UNICEF procures the vaccines. Global public health organizations have built 
relationships with the Ministries of Health and supranational organizations. By leveraging these 
relationships, PDPs can provide market information to the private company partners. To create 
demand, it is important to increase awareness of vaccine value at the highest decision-making 
levels in governments. The cost- effectiveness of vaccines in both in public health and economic 
terms must be highlighted. Pilot studies, are often necessary for evidence-based demonstration 
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of the benefits. In most cases, emerging economy companies lack the capacity or the expertise 
to undertake cost-benefit analysis and disease surveillance work. Unless PDPs help the private 
companies, they do not have the reach or resources to undertake these activities.  
Vaccine prices for most of the developing world are determined through complex 
negotiations with UNICEF. The downward pressure on pricing is strong, as available donor 
funding for vaccine purchases are limited. This is counterbalanced by the need of procurement 
agencies to encourage multiple suppliers to maintain an uninterrupted vaccine supply. PDP 
expertise can navigate through complex negotiations to reach a fair price and the market share 
for the company and country. PDPs provide companies a bridge to gain market assessment and 
price negotiation capabilities.   
7.2.2.6 Case Studies 
In the following case studies, we will highlight specific capacity building that was 
achieved through PDPs. Since most PDPs contribute to all aspects of capacity-building types, the 
cases are chosen to highlight stronger capability of each PDP 
Meningitis Vaccine Project (MVP) 
Meningitis is a bacterial or viral infection of the meninges, the layer that surrounds the brain 
and the spinal cord. The viral infection is less damaging and resolved without any specific 
treatment. However, the bacterial form is much more serious and carries a high risk of 
mortality. There are also debilitating side effects such as deafness, mental defects and epilepsy 
common to the disease survivors. Hib bacterium was the leading cause of meningitis infection 
prior to 1990, which was controlled by a paediatric vaccine.  Since then, Streptococcus 
pneumoniae and Neisseria meningitides (meningococcus) have been the leading causes of 
bacterial meningitis. 
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  In the 1990s, over 100,000 people died in sub-Saharan Africa from meningitis caused by 
meningococcal A infection. At the same time 1,000 died in United Kingdom from meningococcal 
C infection. By 2001, three vaccines were developed against type A infection, while there were 
none developed against C type (Jódar et al., 2003). Finally, because of a successful PDP, in June 
2010 MenAfriVac vaccine against type A received WHO prequalification status.   
 The Meningitis Vaccine Project (MVP) brought four unique organizations together in the 
partnership. CynCo Bio Partners of Netherlands supplied the meningococcal A polysaccharide, 
the Serum Institute of India (SII) supplied the tetanus toxoid and scale up manufacturing 
capacity, the US Food and Drug Administration agency provided the conjugation technology and 
PATH managed all aspects of the partnership and funding. One of the key benefits of this project 
is that SIIL has gained capabilities from technology and knowledge transfer in return for 
negotiated low price and long-term supply commitments. PATH formed an experience technical 
team to address and technical and standardization issues related to scale-up production, who 
worked closely with SII. This conjugation technology and manufacturing expertise transfer 
benefited SII as an emerging country supplier to build capacity in both vaccine development and 
manufacturing (Brooke, Harner-Jay, Lasher & Jacoby, 2007). 
 From the beginning, the focus was to develop a vaccine that would be affordable to 
African countries. Initial evaluation indicated that the vaccine should be priced at no more than 
US $0.40 per dose. The partnership package gave enough other incentives to agree to this 
pricing, which aligned with SII’s high-volume, low-margin business model.  
 Several other key factors contributed to the success of the MVP model. A related 
conjugate meningococcal C vaccine had already been developed. This knowledge made 
identifying antigen candidates simple and kept developmental costs low.  The total projected 
R&D cost for this vaccine is US $65 M, which is significantly lower than industry standards. As 
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demonstrated by the MVP successes, this model of vaccine development is well suited for 
development of similar variants of existing vaccines.  Many diseases vary sub-species by region, 
so it is likely such a model will have use in the future 
The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) 
Today, over 33 million people are infected with HIV, two-thirds of them in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  IAVI was formed in 1996 to address the lack of financial incentive for market driven 
vaccine development.  This was especially problematic for HIV strains that predominate in 
developing countries.  IAVI offered grants to private companies who were developing such 
vaccine candidates to lower their investment risk.  In exchange for the funding, the company 
would agree either to differentiate pricing or to grant a license to IAVI to sell a successful 
vaccine in the developing world (Grossman & Ross, 2010). 
Early on, IAVI build R&D infrastructure and capacity in Africa to gain access to virus 
strains that predominated in the region. With the advances in development program, they have 
built clinical trial infrastructure in the region.  They ran their first clinical trial in collaboration 
with the Kenyan AIDS Vaccine Initiative and completing trials in 11 countries by 2008. Sites were 
chosen, in the words of IAVI’s CMO, as follows: “The most important thing we were looking for 
was African leadership.  Next was HIV rate- you have to go where the risk is-and after that came 
willingness of the researchers, government and community to work with us” (Case Studies for 
Global Health, 2009).  IAVI’s Human Immunology Laboratory in London and the University of 
Witwatersrand Contract Laboratory Services in Johannesburg coordinate the training.  As of late 
2009, the organization had three clinical phase II trials that are partnered with high-income 
country companies, and one phase one trial with the Indian Department of Health (Innovation 
Bridge, 2009). 
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Building good laboratory facilities and providing training has resulted in increase in 
research efforts in these communities.  The Ugandan Virus Research Unit now performs basic 
research on the HIV virus that has informed the design of new vaccine candidates (Case Studies 
for Global Health, 2009).  It is also IAVI’s policy to partner with local community organizations to 
build trust between researchers and communities that is critical for participation in basic 
research and clinical trials. 
Recently, the organization has created several HIV research consortiums that consist of 
academic leaders in the HIV research community.  They have also invested in infrastructure for 
their own research facilities in the US. This includes a US $30M commitment to new facilities at 
Scripps Research Institute in San Diego (Grossman & Ross, 2010).  These two efforts have 
distanced the organization from their earlier efforts to build infrastructure in the developing 
world.  It remains to be seen how this will influence their access to patients and local 
researchers in Africa.   
International Vaccine Institute (IVI) 
The International Vaccine Institute (IVI) is an organization completely dedicated to 
development of vaccines for developing countries. With a United Nations mandate, IVI was 
formally established in 1997 and first laboratory operations began in 2003 in Seoul, Korea.  Over 
the past 12 years, IVI has established major research programs in 28 developing countries. IVI 
works to fill gaps that exist in translational research, basic research, development, 
manufacturing, technical support and capacity building in developing countries so that regional 
vaccine development can take place. One of the major strengths of IVI is research and 
development capacity building in developing countries (IVI 2010a).  
As a part of knowledge building, IVI has established the only international vaccinology 
course in the Asia Pacific region. In-house research facilities and field sites attract numerous 
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researchers who come to learn about vaccine development. These training programs are the 
basis for strengthening scientific research capabilities in developing countries. No other public 
organization in vaccine field is combining research programs and broad training activities to 
build capacity in the developing world (Access to Pharmaceuticals, 2010).  
IVI has strong record of accomplishment of designing and development of vaccines 
against shigellosis, cholera, and typhoid fever, diseases that are predominant in most 
impoverished developing countries in the region. With funding assistance from the Gates 
Foundation, the Government of Korea and the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA), IVI scientists recently developed a cholera vaccine. This vaccine is a modified 
form of a cholera vaccine that is produced Vietnam under GMP standards and WHO production 
guidelines. After successful clinical trials in India and Vietnam, manufacturing partner Shantha 
Biotechics has taken over production and distribution (IVI, 2010b). Supporting regional 
companies will build capabilities that increase local manufacturing capacity.  
Japanese Encephalitis Project 
JE is a mosquito-borne viral disease that endemic to much of Asia.  50,000 cases are 
reported each year, though the numbers affected are thought to be much higher due to 
incomplete reporting.  JE kills 20-35% of those infected and leaves 2/3rds of survivors with 
serious neurological damage (WHO, 2010f).    
In 2005, an outbreak of JE in Nepal and India galvanized the Indian government to 
initiate a vaccination program in their country.  PATH had already identified an ideal vaccine 
candidate produced by the Chengdu Institute of Biological Products (CDIBP) branch of the China 
National Biotech Group.  The vaccine had been used in China for over 15 years with 200 million 
children vaccinated.  A single dose was required to generate immunological protection, making 
it ideal for administration in remote and resource poor settings (PATH, 2010d).  However, the 
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vaccine had never been administered outside of China.  It was not accessible through UN 
organizations, as China, to date, does not have a recognized NRA.  PATH initiated a relationship 
with CDIBP to bring the vaccine outside of the country.  PATH’s work with the organization 
included: 
1. Assessment of market size for the vaccine, 
2. establishing a differential pricing structure based on annual gross national product, 
3.  strengthening of GMP and regulatory infrastructure in China to accelerate the path to 
WHO pre-qualification for the vaccine , and 
4. clinical trial setup outside of China to support introduction to new countries affected by 
the disease (Yaich, 2009). 
The potential for increasing access to vaccines expands much beyond the candidate for 
JE in this collaboration.  Because of China’s enormous population, it has the world’s largest 
national vaccine manufacturing capacity.  Enabling robust Chinese manufacturers to sell their 
products globally could dramatically increase the number of providers available for any one 
product.  A desire to expand market share may further accelerate adoption of global GMP 
standards and regulatory infrastructure.  Improved communication with Chinese manufacturers 
may also uncover other inexpensive, effective vaccines with utility for global health.   
7.2.3 Challenges for PDPs and Recommendations  
The successes of PDPs are not without many challenges. These partnerships are complex 
and difficult to establish. Even with public sector assurances, the private sector sees an 
uncertain return on the investment. Complex management and organization issues can distract 
from the ultimate goal. The structure of these partnerships is not always balanced with financial 
resources and knowledge, which are indicators of power. Lack of formal internal governance is 
cited as a major risk to PPP success.  As an example, the external evaluation of the “Roll Back 
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Malaria Project” project found that the loose governance structure made the concept of 
partnership and the roles of each partner unclear (Yamey, 2002; Feachem et al., 2002). This 
power imbalance is one of the major factors for information asymmetry, bounded rationality 
and opportunism that lead to vaccine market failure.  
PDP partnerships must also manage the differences in motivations between the public 
sector and the private sector. The motivation for the public sector is primarily social benefit 
while profit-generating opportunities motivate the private sector. If there is no common ground 
within these goals, motivations can pose a hindrance to the process, influencing developmental 
time, cost and quality of the product. 
PDPs are often focused on developing a single product. This focus ignores the context of 
the health care system in which it must operate. Other complementary resources require for 
successful launch of the vaccine, such as medical infrastructure, need consideration. In addition, 
the public partner invests significant resources in the form of funds, expertise and logistical 
support to build a successful partnership. However, if such an investment is utilized for a single 
vaccine or device candidate, the same investment must be re-initiated in the next partnership. 
Instead, public sector should seek to maximize the return of investment by forming vaccine 
pipeline associated with each partnership. 
PDPs are designed to stop or cure a neglected disease through a product solution. 
Attention is paid to finding a quick solution at a cost-effective manner. The successors are 
measured by quantifiable outputs, while processors and process capacity is neglected. With the 
increasing demand for vaccine solution (and other healthcare solutions) for neglected disease, 
there to be a policy change towards inclusion of processors and process capacity as measurable 
successors. Lessons learned in one PDP can be applied to reduce the time and financial cost of 
another PDP. Public organizations need to find a way to work together to maximize capacity 
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built within developing countries. This is the best way to maximize funds donated by the global 
community.    
There is a significant push from funding organizations to reducing vaccine prices as close 
as possible to the cost of production. This is a genuine policy to increase vaccine access to the 
low-income countries; however, the long-term sustainability is questionable.  Specifically, the 
privet entity needs to be able to re-invest in facilities, update technologies and make some 
profits in the long-term. These reinvest mechanisms are important to develop next generation 
vaccines without further dependence on donor organizations. There should be a policy 
alternative to the current cost structure that would invite other private companies to establish 
sustainable manufacturing capabilities in the middle- and low-income markets.       
7.3 Technology Licensing 
We define technology licensing as a free-market transfer of vaccine production 
expertise from a developed country manufacturer to one in a low- or middle- income country 
manufacturer.  The fact that such agreements have existed without support from NFP 
organizations indicates that the model is attractive to both parties.  In these agreements, it has 
been essential that the market access the MVC receives is large enough to warrant the 
investment, and that good vaccine support infrastructure- i.e., a NRA- is present in the 
technology-recipient country.   
7.3.1 Synflorix for Brazil 
Brazil exemplifies the possibility of unsupported technology transfers from MVCs.  Since 
1985, Bio Manguinhos, Brazil’s major nationalized manufacturer, has signed five technology 
transfer deals.  The most recent was for GSK’s pneumococcal vaccine, Synflorix.  This agreement 
covers a period of 8 years.  In exchange for stepwise technology transfer from GSK backwards 
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through the value chain, the country has agreed to purchase Synflorix exclusively over the 
period.  As described by the director of Bio Manguinhos, there must be a win-win situation for 
both parties to engage in an involved business relationship like a technology transfer (Homma, 
2009).  For Bio Manguinhos, the agreement means that the country accesses this vaccine 
relatively quickly after adoption in high-income countries; it also brings in a conjugation 
technology, a critical formulation innovation used in many vaccine candidates.  For GSK, the 
company has a committed market for 8 years and a price point that is higher than that paid by 
the AMC.  Moreover, they have insulated against competition from Prevnar-13 in a large 
market.  Pfizer’s pneumococcal vaccine provides protection against more strains of the bacteria, 
and had revenues of almost US $3 B relative to Synflorix, with revenues of £73 M in the last 
three quarters of 2009.  
The Brazilian government, in an effort to encourage other technology transfer 
agreements such as this, has improved legislation to protect and incentivize innovation in the 
country (Homma, 2009).  Vaccine technology transfers have been ongoing with GSK since the 
mid 1980s.  Last year, the Butantan Institute signed a technology transfer agreement with Sanofi 
for their pandemic influenza vaccine.  This was the second agreement with a MVC, and marked a 
growing recognition by large manufacturers of the value of middle-income vaccine markets, 
especially ones with exclusive access. We see this model as being highly successful for countries 
with nationalized vaccine manufacture.  It may be successful for countries like China where the 
country size is large enough that the market is still attractive even without exclusivity. 
One limitation of current technology transfer agreements is that they do not allow 
exports to third party countries.  It would be ideal if a country such as Brazil could transfer these 
vaccines to other countries in the region with similar endemic diseases and average income.  
  
112 
This presumably could be a ‘win-win’ for the vaccine manufacturer as well, since it might allow 
them access to countries that would delay buying the vaccine otherwise. 
7.4 Innovation Partnerships 
Innovative partnerships are an effective mechanism to transfer technologies to the 
emerging country vaccine developers and manufacturers. Collaborations between two smaller 
companies with equal risk sharing benefits both entities. Smaller companies in the developed 
markets are actively seeking market opportunities in developing countries. Joint ventures (JV) 
are becoming a free-market method of gaining entry to the market while the developing 
countries gains access to innovations that may leapfrog the efficiency of current technologies.  
7.4.1 Cadila- Novavax Joint Venture 
In 2009, Novavax Inc. and Cadila Pharmaceuticals entered into a joint venture to 
develop and manufacture vaccines and other biologics using technologies developed by both 
companies. The JV, named CPL Biologicals, will build additional research and manufacturing 
capacity in India (Topnews, 2009). This strategic venture brings in unique vaccine technologies 
to the Indian industry.  
Novavax Inc. is a US-based clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company that had 
developed unique virus-like-particle (VPL) technology to produce vaccines. The company has 
developed novel efficient procedures to develop potent VLP-based recombinant vaccines 
(Novavax, 2010). Cadila Pharmaceuticals Lt. is one of the largest private pharmaceutical 
companies in India. Cadila manages an integrated portfolio of healthcare solutions, which 
includes cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, infectious, and respiratory disease. Products are 
manufactured in India and sold in over 50 countries worldwide (Cadila Pharma, 2010).   
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On June 10th 2010, CPL Biologicals announced completion of the state-of-the-art vaccine 
manufacturing facilities in Dholka, India. Validation of the facilities is ongoing and expected to 
produce up to 60 million doses of novel vaccines per year (Biospace, 2010). Initially, the facilities 
plan to produce influenza vaccines based on Novavax’s VPL technology. As Indian counterparts 
gain experience with the new technology, it is expected that other innovative vaccines will be 
produced.  
Through technology transfer JVs, developing countries can prepare to address regional 
vaccine needs. This is a win-win scenario to both private companies. However, the cost of 
vaccines produced with new technologies is still unknown. One possibility could be government-
funding programs to help local companies form JVs to bring in newer technologies, which could 
allow cheaper overall cost of manufacturing. As competition increases with more companies 
adopting VLP technologies, vaccine prices will decrease to market equilibrium.  
7.5 Not-for-Profit Vaccine Manufacturing  
As we discuss in our section on the vaccine value chain, vaccine development is a 
complex and expensive process. PDPs have been successful in advancing new vaccine 
development, but are usually dependent on the private entity for manufacturing capabilities. 
Even in the high-income countries, it has been our personal experience that access to pilot 
manufacturing for clinical candidates is limited. There is often a wait list. For approved vaccines 
that predominantly address emerging economy needs, increasing price pressure placed on 
vaccine manufacturers’ risks long-term sustainability of supply. As in the early 1990s, 
manufacturers may again withdraw from the market.  In most cases, the negotiated price is the 
cost of goods and a small mark-up for profits.  Price pressure also makes funds for re-investment 
in next generation vaccines or newer vaccines unlikely. Hence, the question is whether there is 
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alternative model that can provide long-term opportunities for vaccine production and 
innovation. 
    Philanthropic organizations that have embarked on vaccine development through 
PDPs have typically built infrastructure in emerging economies for several of the components in 
the vaccine value chain. However, vaccine manufacturing is a segment that has not been built 
into these partnerships. Filling this gap is the next logical step for capacity building. Therefore, 
we propose a new model where NFPs build manufacturing and fill/finish infrastructure within 
emerging economies with no manufacturing facilities. This manufacturing capacity within 
developing county markets will help to build a sustainable industry responsive to regional needs. 
We propose two types of manufacturing facilities be constructed by NFP consortiums.  
The first would be a pilot plant for the production of vaccine candidates.  The second would be a 
facility for the manufacture of licensed vaccines for regional needs.  Both proposed facilities 
would be constructed with donor funds and managed by global NFP consortiums. The strategy is 
to build a NFP-board with diverse financial and political base with a global presence. This will 
allow for a global focus and access to geographically unrestricted funding for the manufacturing 
facility (Berkley, 2006).Quality would be maintained to international GMP standards.   
Following are examples of some of the costs or recent manufacturing plants.    
1) Panacea has completed a multi-use bulk manufacturing facility in Lalru, Punjab in 
2010. This included a train for mammalian cell culture vaccine production, another for microbial 
products, and a third for viral vaccines. The entire facility will produce to WHO and FDA 
standards of GMP. The total investment was estimated at Rs. 1 B (~US 22 M).   
2) A proposed vaccine-manufacturing facility for the Canadian HIV Vaccine Initiative 
(CHVI) was estimated to cost CAD $88 M. According to the authors of the original proposal, this 
facility would have had the capabilities to manufacture clinical trial size lots using three different 
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technologies. He further estimated that a clinical trial lot would cost $250,000 to $1 M, 50% less 
than what would be charged by a private manufacturer (CMAJ, 2010).  
3) In May of this year, Novavax completed a VLP vaccine facility in the US for the cost of 
$5 M.  Because the process is simpler than for many traditional vaccines, the facility is 1/3 
smaller and uses about ¼ of the electricity of a conventional plant.    The capacity of the facility 
will be about 10 million doses a year. Based on these successes, it is cost effective to build 
manufacturing facilities in developing countries.     
Developing country manufacturers are already adapting the latest manufacturing 
technologies to increase safety and efficiency in vaccine production. The Novavax Inc-Cadila 
Pharmaceuticals joint venture is a good example. The proposed facilities should also incorporate 
the latest technologies that will be demanded for newer vaccine production. VLP technology is 
used in many of the current vaccines candidates; incorporating this technology will be 
strategically important. Newer aseptic automated filling/finish equipment like that 
manufactured by VanRx technologies can be utilized to cost effectively control production 
capacity.  
The pilot plant would be situated proximally to a region with a significant number of 
ongoing clinical trials.  As clinical trials are being run in Kenya for IAVI, the TB Aeras Foundation, 
and the RTS,S malaria vaccine candidate, we propose pilot plant construction in this country.  
South Africa would be another option for proximity to clinical trial sites, and would offer the 
advantage of having a NRA assessed as functional by the WHO.  
There are many advantages for having well managed, publicly owned vaccine 
manufacturing facilities in developing countries. PPPs have successfully negotiated with private 
manufacturers to charge low vaccine prices for the developing world. However without a profit 
making incentive, NFP-owned CMO facility can supply at COGS plus a small margin that can 
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further lower price. Having access to cheaper, high quality vaccine when needed is primary 
importance for the developing country markets. Collectively, procurement agencies will have 
access to cheaper vaccines extending accessibility.       
Regional production of vaccines will reduce the strain on cold chain management and 
transport system. The cost associated with vaccine supply increases with cold-chain transport 
distance prior to reaching the end user. Customs clearance, storage, cold-chain breakdown, 
transport cost and vaccine spoilage can result in significant wastage. Lead-time from a distant 
supplier can also hinder access. The proposed regional manufacturing facilities will circumvent 
many of these problems. By providing services to a specific region, the manufacturing facility 
can monitor the demand for specific vaccines and tailor production levels for quick access. 
Regional facilities can work in conjunction with regional procurement agencies to determine the 
demand for each vaccine and control production levels. These are factors already affecting 
MVCs, whose products are reaching low- and middle-income countries. Once a fully 
manufacturing facility is in operation, MVCs may be compelled to use such facilities given the 
benefits; however, the facility will have to build a strong record of accomplishment before this 
can happen. Lack of manufacturing oversight that could result in poor production and product 
liability will be of concern for MVCs.    
There are multiple PPPs operating in developing countries aiming to develop new 
vaccines for neglected diseases. With this NFP-CMO model, PPPs can collaborate to produce 
clinical trial batches of vaccine close to clinical trial sites. This facility can support the 
manufacturing need of other NFP organizations and PPPs reducing trial cost.  Sharing the 
facilities by other public organizations will help to maximize the value of donor financing.  With 
multiple PDPs using one manufacturing facility, economies of scope will result.  There should be 
less idle time in a plant that produces multiple vaccines, which will reduce per project costs; 
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knowledge from one manufacturing process can also benefit others.   Capacity building for 
manufacturing will help African and Asian countries to achieve economic autonomy. Reduction 
of unemployment rates, increased workforce skills, and decreased dependence on foreign 
suppliers will result from local increased capacity. There will be indirect job creation from 
infrastructure support for the CMO, especially if raw materials are supplied locally that is 
supporting or supported by the CMO.      
One of the major barriers to entry for small biotechnology companied is the lack of 
biologics manufacturing capacity. GMP facilities and regulatory expertise are not readily 
available. Building and maintaining GMP facilities are cost-prohibitive for these companies. The 
proposed facility will encourage new vaccine development programs for the region. NFP run 
CMOs will act as a catalyst for local innovations and provide cost-effective vaccine production 
for clinical trials and later on, full manufacturing capacity. These private sector contracts will 
generate additional revenues to maintain, expand, and continually modernize capacity. The 
revenues generated from contract services can be invested into development programs, 
expanding manufacturing capacity and integration of newer technologies.  
A NFP-CRO will become a major catalyst for building manufacturing knowledge capacity. 
International experts can train locals in all aspects of scientific techniques, development and 
implementation of new technologies, maintenance and upgrade of equipment, and regulatory 
knowledge required to operate a GMP facility. When a critical scientific and technical knowledge 
mass is reached, these local experts can disseminate training further into local industry.  
Furthermore, such experts could begin private manufacturing facilities that contribute to the 
local supply. Innovation diffusion through knowledge networks can help in-country academic 
and biotechnology sector as well as regional sectors. These networks are essential in bringing 
local solutions to neglected diseases of the region.   
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Table 7: Advantages and Challenges for NFP-CMOs 
Global Health 
Stakeholder 
Potential Roles Advantages of NFP-
CMO relationship 
Challenges of NFP-
CMO relationship 
Developing countries - Communicate demand - Potentially lower cost 
product 
-  Shorter product lead 
times 
- Local capacity building 
- Potential upgrade of 
NRA 
 
- Underdeveloped NRA 
- Lack of political will 
and motivation 
- Trained personal 
- Transparency  
PPP-PDP Vaccine R&D and 
establish line within 
CMO for developing 
country markets 
- Leverage CMO facility 
for new projects 
- Leverage for clinical 
trial lots 
- May require new 
manufacturing experts 
to join CMO 
- Limited to existing 
CMO technologies w/o 
funding for 
manufacturing 
Local biotech/ 
regional biotech 
- Build knowledge 
capabilities   
- Provide R&D and raw 
materials for CMO 
- Marketing of the 
product 
- Increase access to 
developing counties 
- Eliminate fixed costs 
associated with 
manufacturing facility 
- Underdeveloped 
biotech sector 
- Lack of expertise  
 
MVCs - Provide R&D and raw 
materials for CMO,  
- Marketing of the 
product 
- Increase access to 
developing counties 
- Eliminate fixed costs 
associated with new 
facility 
- Lack of product 
oversight 
- Liability for product  
- Unknown and variable 
contract manufacturing 
costs 
 
Global health donors - Investment cost 
exceeding that of JE 
Project 
- Potential to leverage 
investment across many 
vaccines 
- Additional insight into 
COGS and developing 
country needs 
- Large upfront 
investments 
- Unknown sustainability 
of manufacturing model 
Source: Authors  
There are number of barriers to overcome for this model to work (See summery Table 
7). Specifically, gaining support from developing country governments will be challenging. In 
countries such as India, where a robust local manufacturing industry exists, an NFP-CMO would 
not be valued or valuable. However, support from global organization such as WHO as to the 
  
119 
benefits can influence the appropriate host country government. The goal of these facilities 
should not be to compete against vaccines in the free market. Instead, emphasis has to be on 
new vaccines for neglected diseases and equilibrating speed of access to vaccines for emerging 
markets.  Secondly, the donor community will need convincing of the long-term potential 
benefits of the investment. For example, there are number of Gates Foundation funded PPPs 
that lack internal manufacturing capabilities. Investment from multiple NFPs will be required to 
maximize the efficiency of a manufacturing site and so buy-in must be broad.  The message that 
a NFP-CMO can provide long-term support for disease prevention must be conveyed. The most 
successful method would be through evidence-based demonstration.  
We suggest a pilot project to collect initial data and examine the feasibility of a NFP-
CMO. Pilot manufacturing facilities can be built, tested and validated for clinical trial-size lot 
manufacturing. Building regional production capacity for clinical trials will help to better 
estimate timelines and reduce vaccine developmental cost. Manufacturing can flexibly align 
with the demand for test vaccines. In cases where subject recruitment is sporadic, proximity of 
the manufacturing facility can determine efficient operations of trial sites. Less dependence on 
MVC or for-profit CMOs will be both time and cost-efficient.  
Newer modular manufacturing technologies will help tailor production volume to meet 
demand. Smaller facilities will cost less and risk tolerance will be higher. Facilities in emerging 
countries have been estimated to cost 25%-50% of those in high-income settings, though this 
gap may be closing as GMP standards become increasingly stringent (Wilson, 2010). However, it 
is still cost-effective to build and operate in a low- or middle-income country as the property, 
construction and labour costs are significantly lower (Brooks, 2010; Popova, 2010).  Global 
public health organizations will need to work together closely to set clear expectations of the 
facility’s use priorities, allocation of responsibility and plan for self-sustainability of the site. A 
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successful demonstration of an NFP-CMO will help garner support from the donor community to 
expand into full-scale regionally based manufacturing facilities. If the pilot facility can generate 
stable demand, operate with low costs and contribute to the donor community‘s vaccine 
development goals, there will be support for funding a full manufacturing facility. As funding per 
program becomes limited by increasing numbers of different programs and financial constraints 
from the recession, we believe donors will respond positively to a multi-user manufacturing 
facility that provides multiple cost efficiencies.  Our vision for a NFP-managed licensed vaccine 
manufacturer is one where the facility would work closely with a regional procurement 
organization to prioritize manufacture.  The facility would be situated in a region that does not 
currently have an NRA.  The absence of vaccine production in entire regions of the world 
exacerbates the concentration of the industry and threatens stable supply.  Support would be 
given to the host nation to build a WHO recognized NRA, initiated prior to construction.  An 
“IFFIm like” funding mechanism for the facility may even be appropriate.   Donors would commit 
long-term funds to the site; investors buy bonds based on the commitments, accelerating 
funding for construction to the early phase while providing some potential for financial return if 
the endeavour is successful. 
  
Figure 9: Proposed Not-for-Profit Manufacturing Model
Source: Authors  
7.6  Summary 
In this chapter, we have reviewed key models by which access to vaccines, especially 
new vaccines, has been improved for the developing world.  Most of these models have the 
potential for long-term sustainability and each of them have unique characteristics that are 
beneficial for specific types of vaccine development. Moreover, there are 
models that have required public funding in the past, such as partnerships between low
high-income country manufacturers, are now supported in the free market. PDPs for vaccine 
development have only been operational since the late
development cycle, it is difficult to assess 
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there are incremental improvements and innovations happening that are benefitting vaccine 
markets at both the company and country level.    
 The development of vaccine candidates through partnerships with GSK and 
Biomanguinhos, as well as the Cadila-Novavax JV are especially innovative and importantly 
facilitate new technology transfer to emerging countries. India and Brazil have robust vaccine 
industries and they will continue to grow independently. Countries such as China are gaining 
regulatory and manufacturing scale-up capabilities through partnerships, which will enable sales 
outside of China.   
 PDPs and other pull and push mechanisms will continue to be required for the rest of 
the developing world.  We have proposed a new donor funded NFP-CMO based model for 
vaccine manufacturing that would reduce vaccine development and manufacturing cost to PDPs 
and, in its second phase, increase regional production.  
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8: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE NEW 
VACCINE ACCESS 
The industry analysis, evaluation of the strategic importance of innovation, and 
description of the differences in the vaccine markets all indicate that vaccine innovation is 
almost exclusively motivated by sales in high-income countries. The majority of vaccine related 
innovations occur in developed countries.  Over time, developing country manufacturers 
incorporate them. However, emerging economies are beginning to engage directly in vaccine 
development through JV and technology transfer agreements with MVCs. As these agreements 
are based in the free market, often the ventures are motivated by profits rather than the local 
public health needs. The rise of Product Development Partnerships (PDPs) has begun to enable 
vaccine innovation that meets the needs of countries most affected by infectious disease. Some 
new vaccines from PDPs have reached licensure and others are in late-stage trials.   
In many instances, PDPs have also helped to build value-chain capacity with private 
enterprise partners in the developing world.  Capacity building has occurred throughout the 
value chain from R&D through to commercialization.  The current success of these vaccine PDPs 
are can be attributed to the public partner owning  the development risk, thereby encouraging 
private companies to develop products for low- and middle-income markets.   
While the many efforts for vaccine development and their successes are heartening, 
there are also valid concerns about the sustainability of vaccine partnerships over the long-term.  
A number of “push” and “pull” funding mechanisms have been successful. However, many of 
these efforts are dependent on donor funds from wealthy nations or foundations whose net 
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worth have been severely impacted by the recent global recession. The majority of PDPs receive 
funds through a single organization, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.   
Furthermore, recent natural disasters and other global catastrophes are diverting the 
resources of the donor community. GAVI is already reassessing their vaccine support for the 
next 5 years due to financial concerns (Usher, 2010).  PDPs have much less certain returns on 
investment than for vaccine purchase and may therefore find their support even more reduced.    
While many PDPS have succeeded precisely because of their disciplined focus on the 
development of a single vaccine, the capacity that has been built may not translate to 
knowledge that will be useful for the success of another vaccine. PDPs have partnered with 
existing vaccine companies in the developing world rather than starting de novo efforts.  
However, it has meant that vaccine manufacture has been strengthened in a region that already 
had a competitive industry.  Vaccine security remains a major concern for UNICEF and limits its 
negotiating power. There are still regions that have no regional manufacturing infrastructure.   
For this reason, we propose a donor funded, NFP managed pilot plant for vaccine 
manufacture.  As discussed in Chapter 7, this would be situated in a region where other PDP 
capacity types have already been built, such as clinical trial network in South Africa and Kenya.  
Initially, this facility will provide clinical-trial lots to regional PDPs. The facility will have the 
capacity to produce new inexpensive vaccine types like DNA, so that it can support future 
manufacturing demands. If the pilot is successful, it would be possible to expand to a post-
licensure facility that is able to manufacture commercial scale product. This proposed NFP-CMO 
is meant to increase availability of new vaccines at a lower cost. Because the facility will be 
modular, production can be tailored and long term vaccine demand forecasting will be less 
important.  The strategic selection of location will help to build local capacity, economic and 
social development.   
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All the vaccine access models we examined have an important role in delivering vaccines 
to developing countries. The resources and knowledge of MVCs are still necessary to develop 
complex vaccines. Technology transfer and JVs with these organizations enable developing 
country suppliers to address regional demand. PDPs are needed to continue to the development 
of neglected disease vaccines.    However, mechanisms for vaccine access must be initiated 
within PDPs that do not require external funds, to ensure the continued improvements to 
vaccine access for developing countries. 
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